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 TRUTH AND LEGITIMACY (IN COURTS) 
Kenneth S. Klein* 
This Article draws upon empirical and theoretical scholarship from 
philosophy, economics, social science, psychology, political science, ethics, 
and jurisprudence, in addition to more traditional legal sources such as 
Supreme Court decisions, to develop an articulation of the meaning, role, 
and importance of truth in courts.  It is frequently articulated that trials are 
a search for truth.  But as insiders to the judicial system know, if this is so 
then it is a meaning of truth that differs what truth means in any other 
context.  And exposing this definitional dissonance in turn exposes that the 
legitimacy of the courts rests on an eroding foundation as courts 
increasingly are not doing what the community believes courts are doing.  
* Professor of Law, California Western School of Law.  Because this work draws from so many fields
of study, the Author could not have written it without knowledgeable “fact checkers” from many disciplines; in 
this regard the Author thanks Professor Scott Soames, Distinguished Professor and Director of the School of 
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Management, Burlington Northern/Burlington Resources Professor in Manufacturing Management, Foster School 
of Business, University of Washington; Professor Jeffrey L. Yates, Professor of Political Science, Binghamton 
University, State University of New York; Professor Luke Meier, Baylor Law School; my colleagues, Professor 
Don Smythe; Professor Mario Conte; Professor Daniel Yeager. and Professor Tim Casey. The Author thanks 
Professor Lisa Black and Professor Greg Reilly for patiently being sounding boards and editors.  The Author is 
grateful for the research support and assistance of Research Assistant, Shauna Guner, the Library staff of 
California Western School of Law, and Peter Roudik -- Director of the Global Research Center of the Law 
Library of Congress. This Article was written as the Author’s sabbatical project -- the Author thanks the Board of 
Trustees of California Western School of Law for approving this Article as the Author’s Sabbatical Project.  All 
errors in this Article are entirely the Author’s.   
The Author acknowledges the unintended but undeniable inspiration of this Article from then-
University of Texas School of Law student Lisa Black, who as a 1L in 1982 wrote the limerick:   
There once was a fine Texas youth, 
Who sought the world over for truth. 
But that’s not what he saw, 
So he turned to the law, 
Where truth’s just a matter of proof. 
The Author met Lisa Black two years later, has been her spouse since 1985, and has heard this limerick countless 
times over the past 30+ years.
  TRUTH AND LEGITIMACY (IN COURTS)  1
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article seeks to answer what is the meaning of “truth” in 
American trial courts,1 and why one should care.  As big as this inquiry 
sounds, it is tied up in equally large subsidiary questions – the meaning in 
courts of justification, of knowledge, and of belief, which in turn implicate 
the meaning in courts of fairness, of due process, and of “fact.”  And only 
upon answering these questions can one explore the foundation of the 
legitimacy of the courts, and how both the meaning of truth in courts – and 
the public perception of the role of truth in courts – relate to the legitimacy 
of the courts.  No small task, this. 
 There is scant academic literature studying the truth-finding 
function of American trial courts.  And what has been written largely exists 
in the ephemeral context of jurisprudence, rather than the concrete world of 
the truth finding function of trials. 
Part I of this Article applies the multi-millennia work of Philosophy 
in defining truth as a roadmap to isolating the nature of truth in courts.  Part 
I.A of this Article attempts to very, very briefly summarize the 
philosophical literature on truth to isolate a construction of truth that can 
advance an understanding of truth in courts.  The role of truth in courts is a 
pragmatic one, in contrast to the more theoretical concepts within 
jurisprudence.  Within epistemology a construction of truth is less 
ephemeral and more concrete -- is the weak deflationism definition of truth 
within realism, which sees truth as a binomial property that a proposition 
has – it either is true or is not.  Weak deflationism sees truth as residing in a 
constellation of truth-related concepts – knowledge, certainty, and belief – 
each of which leans on the other to derive its meaning and role.  Simply put, 
knowledge requires truth, justification, and belief.   
This formulation of the role of truth -- knowledge requires truth, 
justification, and belief – facilitates isolating the meaning of truth in courts. 
Part I.B of this Article explores justification in courts.  In courts, 
“justification” is defined by the rules of evidence, which directly delineate 
what counts as a “fact” in trials.  Perhaps surprisingly, the rules of evidence 
do not consider all pertinent information as facts in determining trials, but 
                                                
1 The United States federal district courts created pursuant to Article III of the United States Constitution, 
and the trial courts of general civil and/or criminal jurisdiction of the various States of the United States.  This 
Article sometimes collectively refers to these courts as the “American courts.” 
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rather routinely discard facts for either of two reasons: (1) the facts 
presumptively are considered beyond the evaluative skill set of the decision 
maker; or (2) consideration of the facts – while advancing a trial decision – 
undermine an external public goal considered more important than the 
accuracy of trial outcomes.   Part I.B concludes that in justifying a trial 
judgment, not all facts matter. 
Part I.C of this Article explores knowledge in courts.  Knowledge is 
the degree of certainty that must be reached – in light of the goals of the 
process – to stop gathering information and move to taking action.  
Knowledge is a compromise or balance between certainty and finality; 
between perfect and adequate.  It is what we might call the necessary and 
sufficient degree of accuracy.  This is a common balancing determination 
that exits in any information-gathering, decision-making endeavor – how 
much confidence does one need in gathered information in order to act.  In 
courts this balancing determination is seen in burdens of proof.  And what 
burdens of proof expose is that knowledge in courts means reaching a 
“correct enough” resolution, biasing toward certainty when the stakes 
involve liberty and staying near neutral when the stakes are private 
relationships 
Part I.D of this Article explores belief in courts.  “Belief” in courts is 
the “why” of the justice system – what is the role of courts in society and so 
what do we need from them.  Exploration of these questions exposes 
fracture lines between procedural justice and substantive justice; between 
individual fairness and communal fairness; and between objective justice 
and subjective justice.  In the end, belief in courts means the courts have 
procedures for dispute resolution that society generally perceives and 
accepts as a fair opportunity – or perhaps a fair enough opportunity -- to 
present one’s position to a neutral decision-maker. 
From these preceding sections this Article now can turn to Part I.E, 
which draws conclusion about the meaning of truth in courts.  “Truth” – as 
used in the justice system – is “accuracy enough,” meaning there has been 
adequate procedural process to support a general communal sense of 
systemic fairness without regard to the outcome in a particular case.  In 
other words, truth in courts is the measure of accuracy and process 
necessary for courts to enjoy legitimacy. 
And so Part II of this Article examines the possible tension between 
the meaning of truth in courts, on the one hand, and on the other hand the 
basis of the legitimacy of the courts as a societal institution.  Because what 
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emerges from a formulation of the actual meaning of truth in courts is that 
the public perception of the truth-finding function of the courts is at odds 
with the inside, systemic meaning of the truth-finding function of the courts.  
The social science construct of Legitimacy Theory models why 
broadly members of American society accept the legitimacy of societal 
institutions.  Legitimacy theory has been brought to bear to understanding 
why Americans generally accept the legitimacy of the Supreme Court of the 
United States even in the face of decisions the individual disagrees with.  
But there is little analytical work focusing on the legitimacy of the trial 
courts.  There is no work at all focusing on whether a misperception of what 
courts do may undermine the legitimacy of the trial courts.   
Thus, the later half of this Article begins the work of filling those 
gaps.  A review of the extant Legitimacy Theory literature on the courts and 
an application of the lessons from identifying the meaning of truth in courts 
isolates reasons to be concerned that the misperception of what trial courts 
do may undermine trial court legitimacy.  Finally, a tentative conclusion is 
drawn about how unawareness by judges of a “legitimacy” concern is 
driving jurisprudence in potentially problematic directions. 
I. “TRUTH” IN COURTS 
	
The truth-finding function of trial courts almost begs for explication.  
Judges, lawyers, and academics often say that trials are a search for truth.2  
If so, then it would seem to be a different meaning of “truth” than the 
meaning of the word in any other context. Yet there is little legal literature 
directly addressing the nature of the truth in the law generally, or in courts 
specifically.  
That is perhaps understandable.  Deconstructing the nature of truth 
in any context is a daunting challenge.  Philosophy literally has dedicated 
millennia to the task.  But by doing so, philosophy provides an analytical 
base and map to the task. The abstract definition of “truth” resides within a 
                                                
2 See, e.g., Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 166 (1986) (“…the very nature of a trial [is] a search for truth.”); 
Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966) (‘The basic purpose of a trial is the determination 
of truth ….”); United States v. Gray, 897 F.2d 1428, 1429 (8th Cir. 1990) (“A trial is a search for truth ….”); 
RONALD J. ALLEN & ALEX STEIN, Evidence, Probability, and the Burden of Proof, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 557, 567 
(2013) (“We begin with a simple, but oft-neglected, observation: The coin of the legal realm is truth.”).  But see 
G. Kristian Miccio, Giles v. California: Is Justice Scalia Hostile to Battered Women?, 87 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 
93, 95 (2009) (…as currently structured, our adversarial process is many things, but it is not a search for truth.”); 
accord, Marvin E. Frankel, The Search For Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 PENN. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (1975) (“… 
our adversary system rates truth too low among the values that institutions of justice are meant to serve.”).  
Notably, even these critics appear to assume that the courts should be seeking truth. 
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constellation of related epistemological concepts – knowledge, justification, 
and belief.  And by unpacking the nature of knowledge in courts, 
justification in courts, and belief in courts, one can isolate a meaning of 
truth in courts. 
A. “TRUTH” IN PHILOSOPHY AS A TEMPLATE TO 
UNDERSTANDING “TRUTH” IN COURTS3 
Philosophy directly studies the nature of  “truth.”4  For as long as 
there has been philosophy, philosophers have pondered questions – stated in 
lay-like terms -- such as: Can we define the truth?5  What is real?6  Is there 
reality external to our ability to perceive it?7  How can we know and test the 
truth?8 Are moral propositions about the world verifiable?9  Is truth 
paradoxical and therefore incoherent?10  The debate over these and many 
other transcendent philosophical questions about truth is robust, ancient, 
and ongoing.11 
The parallel academic debate about “truth” in law occurs within the 
study of “jurisprudence.”12  Jurisprudence posits truth inquiries such as 
what it means to say that a legal proposition – for example, “murder is bad” 
-- is true (ontology13), and how the answer to that inquiry is determined 
(epistemology14).  Both are classic philosophical inquiries about truth.15 
                                                
3 This section of this Article carries an enormous caveat:  The philosophical study of truth has been the focus 
of countless papers, dissertations, books, careers, and entire fields of study.  The terminology and conceptual 
architecture of that work provides a useful conceptual frame for this Article.  But there is no way to delve into the 
area without gross over-simplification both conceptually and in the way jargon and terminology is deployed.  One 
simply cannot capture the breadth and richness of that work in a few pages.  A reader sophisticated in the field 
will immediately spot the slippage that comes from simplification.  It is unavoidable.  That is why while I will – 
within in the confines of simplification – endeavor to be as precise as possible with how I am using particular 
terminology, I also will attempt to be clear when the terminology I am using is similar in meaning but not 
identical to how it might be used in the academic literature of philosophy. 
4  See, e.g., BARRY ALLEN, TRUTH IN PHILOSOPHY 1 (Harvard Univ. Press 1993).  
5 See generally, Gottlob Frege, “Der Gedanke.  Ein logische Untersuchung,” in Beitrage zur Philosophie des 
deutschen Idealismus 1 (1918): 58-77, translated into English as “Thoughts” by P. Geach & R. H. Stoothoff in 
Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy ed. B. McGuinness (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), 
351-72, reprinted in Propositions and Attitudes, ed. N. Salmon & S. Soames (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 
1988), 33-55. 
6 See D. M. ARMSTRONG, TRUTH AND TRUTHMAKERS at 1 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2004). 
7 See generally, CRISPIN WRIGHT, TRUTH AND OBJECTIVITY (Harvard Univ. Press 1992). 
8 See generally, D. M. ARMSTRONG, TRUTH AND TRUTHMAKERS at 4 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2004). 
9 See SCOTT SOAMES, UNDERSTANDING TRUTH 32-39 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999). 
10 See SCOTT SOAMES, UNDERSTANDING TRUTH 49-56 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999). 
11 See generally, BARRY ALLEN, TRUTH IN PHILOSOPHY 178-79 (Harvard Univ. Press 1993); 
12 See, e.g., DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH (Oxford Univ. Press 1996); LAW AND LANGUAGE: 
CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES VOLUME 15 (Michael Freeman & Fiona Smith eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2013); RONALD 
DWORKIN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (Ronald Dworkin ed.) (Oxford Univ. Press 1977); Jules L. Coleman, Truth 
and Objectivity in Law, 1 LEGAL THEORY 33 (1995). 
13 Ontology is the branch of metaphysics concerned with the nature of being or existence.  Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ontology (last visited October 30, 2014). 
14 “Defined narrowly, epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief. As the study of 
knowledge, epistemology is concerned with the following questions: What are the necessary and sufficient 
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The kind of truth inquiry that occurs in trial courts, however, is 
different from the truth inquiries of jurisprudence.  It is more pragmatic and 
pedantic.  Courts ask questions such as “Did the accused do it?” or “Was 
the defense proportionate to the attack?” or “Which car had the green 
light?” or “Did the person act as a reasonably prudent person would act?  
Each of these questions is a variant of the question, “What happened?”   
There is essentially no academic literature on the nature of those 
truth inquiries, what we might shorthand as an attempt to understand the 
meaning of truth in courts.  And the inquiry is as elusive as the more 
abstract jurisprudential inquiry.16 
Seeking a pragmatic definition of “truth” most closely approximates 
the epistemological theory of “weak deflationism,” which is a form of 
“realism.”   Philosophical definitions of truth broadly can be divided into 
realism and anti-realism. One explanation of these two views is:  
Realism involves at least the claim that there is reality 
independent of us and our minds ….  The facts may go 
beyond anything we are capable of ascertaining, but the 
truth is so by virtue of those facts and that reality.  …  
The question at issue, therefore, is whether what is to be 
understood in any proposition lies simply in what sort of 
fact makes it true -- in other words, its truth-conditions.  
Anti-realism holds that … to understand a proposition we 
need also to know its verification-conditions; we need, 
that is, a recognition of when its truth conditions apply, 
and when we are justified in holding that they do.17   
Put another way -- and admittedly perhaps too simplistically -- realism 
posits that there is objective, external “truth,” while anti-realism asserts that 
a system -- through its system rules and assumptions – contributes to create 
and define truth.  Within realism, the most concrete definition of “truth” 
comes from the “minimalism” version of “deflationism” -- also known as 
                                                                                                                       
conditions of knowledge? What are its sources? What is its structure, and what are its limits? As the study of 
justified belief, epistemology aims to answer questions such as: How we are to understand the concept of 
justification? What makes justified beliefs justified? Is justification internal or external to one's own mind?”  
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/ (last visited October 30, 
2014). 
15 See generally, D. M. ARMSTRONG, TRUTH AND TRUTHMAKERS 4 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2004). 
16 Accord, Brian Bix, Linguistic Meaning in Legal Truth, 15 CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES: LAW AND LANGUAGE 
34 (Oxford Univ. Press 2013). Bix begins his essay on “Legal Truth” by quipping – paraphrasing Augustine – that 
truth is something we all know until we are asked to explain it.   
17 D. W. HAMLIN, METAPHYSICS 28-29 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1984). 
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“weak deflationism” -- which defines “truth” as a property that a 
“proposition” has (or not) -- a proposition either is true or false.18   
The “truth” formulation of realism -- and within realism, of weak-
deflationism -- is a close analog the truth-finding function of trial courts.  A 
system that self-describes itself as a “search for truth” is describing a 
realism understanding of truth – in other words, that “truth” is external to 
the system and potentially discernable.  A system that bases actual 
judgments on the evaluation of competing versions of events is describing a 
weak deflationism understanding of truth – in other words, is concluding 
that each version of “what happened” is, in the end, either true or false.   
The weak deflationism formulation of truth is that truth is a 
component of knowledge.19  More precisely, “knowledge” requires “truth,” 
“belief,” and “justification.”20 Put more usefully for our purposes, an 
understanding of knowledge, justification, and belief advances an 
understanding of truth.21   
How then are “knowledge,” “justification,” and “belief” defined 
within philosophy?  Professor Keith Lehrer begins the second edition of his 
book, A Theory of Knowledge, by writing,   “All agree that knowledge is 
valuable, but agreement about knowledge tends to end there.  Philosophers 
disagree about what knowledge is, about how you get it, and even about 
whether there is any to be gotten.”22  Instinctively we might say that to 
“know” something – to be “justified” in the “belief” of the “truth” of a 
proposition – corresponds to what colloquially we might think of as 
“certainty.”  
Perhaps not surprisingly, however, there are robust and complex 
dialogues amongst gifted philosophers spanning generations over a proper 
definition of “certainty.”23 This, in turn, obscures one’s ability to 
                                                
18 See Glen Hoffman, The Minimalist Theory of Truth: Challenges and Concerns, 5 PHILOSOPHY COMPASS 
938-949 (2010); Scott Soames, Understanding Deflationism, 17 PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 369, 377-78 
(2003).   
19 See, e.g., Donald Davidson, A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge, within TRUTH AND 
INTERPRETATION: PERSPECTIVES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF DONALD DAVIDSON 308-319 (Ernest LePore, Editor) 
(Basil Blackwell 1986).  Stated simply, we may or may not know whether a proposition is true (false) – its truth 
property is independent of our knowledge of it. 
20 See generally, Jason Stanley, Knowledge and Certainty, 18 PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES 35-57 (2008).  Accord, 
KEITH LEHRER, THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE, SECOND EDITION 20-21 (Westview Press 2000). 
21 Whether a proposition is true is different from whether we know a proposition is true, whether we can 
know it, whether if we can know it then how we can know it, whether to know it must we be certain of it, whether 
certainty is attainable, how certainty differs from belief, and what justifies belief short of certainty. 
22 KEITH LEHRER, THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE, SECOND EDITION 1 (Westview Press 2000). 
23  See Baron Reed, Certainty, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Winter 2011 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=certainty. 
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confidently define knowledge as “certainty.”24 But for purposes of this 
Article, it is unnecessary to try to resolve these perhaps intractably opposing 
positions.  We can define “knowledge” as an “intuitive” form “certainty” – 
one that avoids the “skeptical” arguments against both “epistemic” and 
“subjective” definitions of certainty.25   
An intuitive form of certainty can be described as the level of 
understanding or explanation that is achieved when all that is possible to be 
known is known, and which leaves no room for an alternative explanation.  
In other words, it is not subjective, but rather is based on the highest level of 
available justification; but it is not epistemic in that it acknowledges there 
may be unavailable information that would support an alternative 
conclusion.26  The weakness of subjective certainty should be apparent – 
one can be subjectively certain and yet wrong.27  The weakness of epistemic 
(or “actual”) certainty is equally patent -- actual certainty may be 
theoretically impossible, and even if actual certainty is theoretically 
possible, in any practical sense absolute certainty is unattainable.28   Put 
another way, even if time and resources were unlimited, “intuitive” 
certainty describes the closest one could come to actual certainty and 
therefore attainable knowledge.   
In philosophy, a definition of “justification” also is elusive and 
contentious.29  For purposes of this Article, a crude statement of the 
“foundationalism” theory of justification suffices – a belief in the truth of a 
proposition is justified when it is derived from predicates external to the 
proposition and which are experienced through the senses.30  In other 
words, justification is an evaluation of the strength of the available 
information. 
“Belief” in philosophical jargon is “the attitude we have, roughly, 
                                                
24  Id.; see also, Jason Stanley, Knowledge and Certainty, 18 PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES 35, 35-57 (2008). 
25 See Jason Stanley, Knowledge and Certainty, 18 PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES 35, 35-57 (2008). 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id.; accord SCOTT SOAMES, UNDERSTANDING TRUTH 29-32 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999); RONALD 
DWORKIN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 8-9 (Ronald Dworkin, Editor) (Oxford Univ. Press 1977) (Dworkin 
describes how a legal positivist  -- an anti-realist – believes that “no sense can be assigned to a proposition unless 
those who use that proposition are all agreed about how the proposition could, at least in theory, be proved 
conclusively;” Dworkin criticizes this view because it means that no controversial proposition of law can be true.). 
29 See, e.g., Erik Olsson, Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-
bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=justep-coherence. 
30 See Richard Fumerton & Ali Hasan, Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification, THE STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Summer 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-
bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=justep-foundational. 
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whenever we take something to be the case or regard it as true.”31  It is hard 
to succinctly describe this meaning of belief in a way that both is accessible 
to the non-philosopher and fits with a normal meaning of the word.  Perhaps 
“belief” is best thought of as what separates wheat from chaff – it sorts 
random conclusions from conclusions that advance the purposes of the 
endeavor one is engaged in.32 Or put another way, in gathering information 
one has a context – a system purpose – that identifies what data justifies a 
conclusion that a proposition is true (false).  H. L. A. Hart alluded to the 
same idea when he wrote that the inquiry “What is law” should be answered 
by considering what concerns motivated the question.33   Crudely speaking, 
the consideration of “concerns motivating the question” describes the role 
of “belief” in “knowledge.”34 
In sum, within weak deflationism, knowledge requires truth, 
justification, and belief.  The inquiries of the nature of each of these 
concepts are the “truth inquiries” of weak deflationists.   
These truth inquiries suggest a template for a how to formulate a 
meaning of truth in courts – isolate the role of truth in courts by first 
exploring the meaning of knowledge, belief, and justification in courts.  But 
we should not jump into this approach naively.  While weak deflationism is 
an analog for the truth-finding function of trial courts, the truth inquiries of 
weak deflationism are not identical to the truth inquiries of the courts. 
Most obviously, the truth inquiry in courts diverges from philosophy 
in that courts seek knowledge that is a step down – perhaps many steps 
down – from “intuitive certainty.”  Yet this difference is not fatal to the 
utility of philosophical jargon to analysis of truth inquiries in courts, 
because what courts do is still within the defined terminology of 
philosophy.  An acceptable epistemological definition of “probability” is 
the likelihood that a proposition we believe to be true is true.35  So in the 
philosophical jargon of “knowledge,” the “knowledge” courts seek is a 
                                                
31 Eric Schwitzgebel, Belief, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Summer 2015 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=belief. 
32  See generally, KEITH LEHRER, THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE, SECOND EDITION 32-41, 72-76, 93, 124-125 
(Westview Press 2000). 
33 See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 5 (2nd ed.) (Clarendon Press 1994).  There is some irony to 
quoting Hart in an Article that uses non-legal disciplines as an analog, as Hart began his own book by contending 
that law is alone among disciplines in being introspective about what it is and why it is doing what it is doing. H. 
L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW at 1 (2nd ed.) (Clarendon Press 1994). 
34 See generally KEITH LEHRER, THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE, SECOND EDITION 12-14 (Westview Press 2000). 
35 It should be apparent that essentially every single term or word in philosophy is more nuanced and 
debatable than the discussion of this Article can capture.  For example, there are at least three definitions of 
“probability,” none of which are devoid of objections.  See generally KEITH LEHRER, THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE, 
SECOND EDITION 86-94 (Westview Press 2000) (detailing the advantages and objections of three formulations of 
“probability”).  But for purposes of this Article, the above definition fits within all three, and will suffice. 
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systemically defined “probability” on a spectrum of knowledge less than 
“intuitive certainty” and more than impossibility. 
Put slightly differently, what courts are doing when they seek the 
“truth” is – and essentially must be -- seeking an adequately justified belief 
about what happened in a case.36  Disputes must have an end at some point, 
and knowledge in the philosophical sense requires the unattainable goal of 
absolute – or even “intuitive” -- certainty.37  Coarsely stated, courts settle 
for “knowledge enough,” based on a “justified enough” “belief enough” that 
a conclusion is “true enough” -- meaning that for purposes of the courts 
there is an acceptable likelihood that the court’s judgment of what happened 
corresponds to what actually happened.38  
So we must recognize that the meaning of knowledge, justification, 
belief, and truth likely are analogous but certainly differ between weak 
deflationists and the courts. It is within this caveat that the weak 
deflationism formulation of truth can overcome the otherwise apparently 
over-daunting task of enunciating a comprehensive formulation of “truth” in 
courts.  Just as within weak deflationism knowledge requires truth, 
justification, and belief, one can posit that “knowledge” in courts (a perhaps 
highly imperfect form of knowledge that is a degree of probability 
indeterminately but materially below intuitive certainty) requires:  
• (a perhaps imperfect form) of “truth” (“truth” in courts),  
• (a perhaps imperfect form) of “justification” (“justification” 
in courts), and  
• (a perhaps imperfect form) of “belief” (“belief” in courts).   
We then can infer the insight that to better understand39 the nature and 
                                                
36 See C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional 
Guarantees, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1295-97 (1982); accord SCOTT SOAMES, UNDERSTANDING TRUTH 31 
(Oxford Univ. Press 1999). 
37 See generally Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL  
STUD. 307 (1994).  See also Susan Haack, Epistemology Legalized: Or, Truth, Justice, and the American Way, 49 
AM. J. JURIS. 43, 47-48 (2004) (“When we need the answer to some question in a hurry, we may be obliged to 
curtail our search for further evidence….  [W]here some action must be taken now, …. We have no choice but to 
decide what to do on the basis of whatever evidence we have.”). 
38  In this context, I am comfortable conflating two concepts – probability (an estimate as to the likelihood of 
a given fact being true) and confidence (how sure one can be about a probability estimate given the information 
available) – that in other legal, doctrinal contexts should not be conflated.  See generally Luke Meier, Probability, 
Confidence, and the Constitutionality of Summary Judgment, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (2014).  Also, a court 
judgment of course not only determines “what Happened,” but also what consequences append to that 
determination.  This Article confines itself to the “”what happened” function of judgments because the 
“consequences determination” function of judgments is not part of the truth inquiry of the courts (as this Article 
defines the truth inquiry aspect of trials). 
39 I use the phrasing “better understand” as I am mindful of Keith Lehrer’s assertion (and explanation) that 
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import of “truth” in courts we must explore more deeply the meaning of 
“justification” in courts, the meaning of “knowledge” in courts, and the 
meaning of “belief” in courts. 
B. Understanding “Justification” in Courts 
The philosophical definition of “justification” is “the predicates 
external to the proposition and which are experienced through the senses.” 
This readily translates to trials.   “Justification” in courts is the set of data 
that counts as a fact – the admissible evidence.  In order to better understand 
“justification” in courts, we look at what counts as a fact in trials and why. 
1. The Rules of Evidence Define What Counts as a 
Fact in Courts 
The Federal Rules of Evidence40 provide a detailed source of the 
meaning of justification in courts.41  Professor John Leubsdorf analyzes the 
Rules of Evidence as a set of ex ante incentives for adversaries.42 But for 
our purposes, the Rules serve a much more concrete function -- the Rules of 
Evidence themselves are where the American courts set forth an explicit 
delineation of what information is admissible evidence – i.e., what counts as 
a “fact” – in a trial.43   
In the language of evidence doctrine, what counts as a fact in trials 
is called “relevant” evidence.  Rule 401 defines as “relevant” any 
information that bears even slightly on anything of consequence in a trial.44  
Rule 402 defines as inadmissible any information that fails to meet the Rule 
401 threshold/definition – all relevant evidence is presumed admissible.45  
                                                                                                                       
“a complete theory of truth is impossible.”  KEITH LEHRER, THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE, SECOND EDITION 29 
(Westview Press 2000). 
40 This portion of the Article is based on the substantive content of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  While 
each State has its own evidence code, in substance the content of the large majority of those codes is virtually 
identical to the content of the federal rules.  6 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S 
FEDERAL EVIDENCE T-1 (Joseph M. McLaughlin, ed.) (Matthew Bender 2d ed. 2014) (noting that 42 states have 
adopted rules of evidence based on the Federal Rules of Evidence). 
41  But see John Leubsdorf, Presuppositions of Evidence Law, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1209, 1212 (2005-2006); see 
also Mark Cammack, Evidence Rules and the Ritual Functions of Trials: “Saying Something of Something”, 25 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 783, 783 (1992) (“evidence law does not embrace its own substantive ends, the purposes of 
evidence law must be determined by reference to the trial which it is designed to regulate.”). 
42 See John Leubsdorf, Evidence Law as a System of Incentives, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1621 (2009-2010).  See 
also, Alex Stein, Inefficient Evidence, 66 ALA. L. REV. 423 (2015) (arguing the rules of evidence are motivated by 
efficiency decisions). 
43 Because the text of the rules and of the Advisory Committee notes, as well as numerous court opinions, 
often explicitly describe the underlying rationales of the rules, I will not address in this Article alternative meta-
explanations such as Alex Stein’s (Alex Stein, Inefficient Evidence, 66 ALA. L. REV. 423 (2015)). 
44  FED. R. EVID. 401. 
45  FED. R. EVID. 402. 
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The rules then detail when that presumption is overcome. 
There are several rules that are purely administrative. But beyond 
these, the Rules of Evidence set forth ways that superficially relevant 
evidence nonetheless is not admissible at trial – in other words, does not 
count as a fact and thus cannot act as justification. 
2. Procedural/Administrative Rules of Evidence 
Some rules of evidence are purely procedural or administrative.  
This entire set of rules -- while they are embedded in the Rules of Evidence 
-- do not directly bear on what the courts count as a fact.  And more to the 
point, these rules do not describe a mechanism either to advancing or 
hindering the likelihood that a trial outcome will correspond to what 
actually happened, which is a description of what courts do that correlates 
to a justified knowledge of truth: 
• Rules 101 (“Scope; Definitions”), 1101 (“Applicability of 
the Rules”), 1102 (“Amendments”), and 1103 (“Title”) – 
beyond simply defining terminology (including the title of 
the rules themselves), set forth the scope of proceedings the 
Rules apply to and how to amend the rules.46   
• Rule 102 (“Purpose”) broadly states the goals of the Rules 
(fairness, efficiency, truth, and justice).47   
• Rules 103-105 (“Rulings on Evidence;” “Preliminary 
Questions;” and “Limiting Evidence That Is Not Admissible 
Against Other Parties of for Other Purposes”) set forth 
procedures for making and ruling on objections.48   
• Rules 106 (“Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded 
Statements”), 301 (“Presumptions in Civil Cases Generally” 
and “Applying State Law to Presumptions in Civil Cases”), 
302 (“Applying State Law to Presumptions in Civil Cases”), 
(“Writing Used to Refresh a Witness’s Memory”), and 613 
(“Witness’s Prior Statements”) set forth the timing of 
                                                
46  FED. R. EVID. 101, 1101, 1102, & 1103. 
47  FED. R. EVID. 102. 
48  FED. R. EVID. 103, 104 & 105. 
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consideration of some evidence, and how the jury is 
instructed about some evidence.49   
• Rule 201 (“Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts”) provides 
a method external to presentation of evidence to put facts 
into the record.50 Rules 601 (“Competency to Testify in 
General”) and 603 (“Interpreter”) define the parameters what 
persons – independent of the content of their testimony – are 
competent to take the stand.51   
• Closely related to who can be a witness are the 
authentication rules52 and the “Best Evidence Rules,”53 
which independent of the content of documents regulate 
when a party can (or must) put a document into evidence 
rather than simply describe what the document says.   
• Rules 611 (“Mode and Order of Examining Witnesses and 
Presenting Evidence”), 614 (“Court’s Calling or Examining 
Witnesses”), 615 (“Excluding Witnesses”), and 706 (“Court-
Appointed Expert Witnesses”) address who may call a 
witness and when, how witnesses may be questioned, and 
when a witness can hear another witness testify.54 
 
                                                
49  FED. R. EVID. 106, 301, 302, 612, & 613.  Some evidence scholars argue that Rules 106 and 612 also are 
rules of admissibility.  See Andrea N. Kochert, Note, The Admission of Hearsay Through Rule 106: And Now You 
Know the Rest of the Story, 46 IND. L. REV. 499 (2013); Dale A. Nance, A Theory of Verbal Completeness, 80 
IOWA L. REV. 825 (1995) (endorsing view that most important function of completeness rule is to trump otherwise 
applicable exclusionary rules); Thomas M. Tomlinson, Note, Pattern-Based Memory and the Writing Used to 
Refresh, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1462, 1481 (1995) (arguing that because a witness may transmit the contents of 
inadmissible evidence through Rule 612, the rule can lead to the effective admission of inadmissible evidence in 
powerful testimonial form); but see CHARLES A. WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, 28 FED. PRAC. & PROC. EVID. 
§ 6183 (2d ed. 1993) (“Rule 612 is not an independent source of admissibility, but simply describes a procedure 
whereby a witness may be assisted in providing admissible testimony.”). Thought of this way, these two rules 
facilitate revealing to the fact finder evidence that otherwise would have been considered injurious to the accuracy 
of fact finding – in other words, unwind the premise as to certain kinds of evidence that the evidence will be too 
confusing to or improperly weighted by the jury.   
50  FED. R. EVID. 201.  Within Rule 201 also is an interesting and rare acknowledgement of the fact finding 
role of the jury.  See Kenneth S. Klein, Why Federal Rule of Evidence 403 is Unconstitutional, and Why That 
Matters, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 1077, 1106-08 (2013). 
51  FED. R. EVID. 601 & 603. 
52  FED. R. EVID. 901, 902, & 903. 
53  FED. R. EVID. 1001, 1002, 1003, 1004, 1005, 1006, 1007, & 1008. 
54 FED. R. EVID. 611, 614, & 615.  One might also argue that each of these rules has a paternalistic 
component – a concern that absent these rules jurors will misapply or improperly weight particular evidence.  
John Leubsdorf describes how authentication rules can be thought of as rules predicated on a distrust of the 
cognitive abilities of judges and jurors.  See John Leubsdorf, Presuppositions of Evidence Law, 91 IOWA L. REV. 
1209, 1234-41 (2005-2006) 
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3. Evidence Rules Protecting the Jury From 
Themselves 
Most of the rules of evidence do seek to advance the likelihood that 
a trial outcome will correspond to what actually happened, but many do so 
in a counter-intuitive way.  Intuitively, we might think that in a trial for 
robbing a convenience store, for example, the accused is more likely guilty 
if they have a past conviction for robbing a convenience store; or that if a 
trial must decide if the traffic light was red, it is helpful to hear from a 
witness who can recount that they were told by somebody else the light was 
red.  Neither is an example of conclusive proof, but both are examples of at 
least some evidence.  Yet at least in trials where the fact-finder is a jury, the 
rules of evidence generally treat both of these examples -- and numerous 
similar examples -- as not justifying a correct determination of what 
happened, and therefore the evidence is excluded. 
These are examples of the rules codifying the concern that juries 
will misunderstand, be confused by, or improperly weigh certain kinds of 
evidence.55  The Rules of Evidence simply do not trust – and come close to 
being openly derogatory of -- the analytical and emotional abilities of 
jurors.56   Therefore, in order to maximize the likelihood that a jury verdict 
will accurately determine what happened in a case, the rules keep relevant 
evidence from the jury on the presumption that jurors are easily confused 
and easily bored. 
The “derogatory” view of jurors is most directly seen in Rule 403 
(“Excluding Relevant Evidence for Prejudice, Confusion, Waste of Time, or 
                                                
55  See, e.g., John Leubsdorf, Presuppositions of Evidence Law, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1209, 1210, 1212, 1248, 
1253 (2005-2006) (“The land …. is a realm founded on the untrustworthiness of jurors ….” “…a presupposition 
that underlies many evidentiary rules. … distinctions … between the strengths and weakness of jurors ….” “… 
the accepted view is that much of the law reflects judicial distrust of jurors. … The usual manifestation of mistrust 
is the assertion that jurors ” “…Rules preventing juries from hearing large classes of evidence can best be justified 
by hypothesizing that their weaknesses will prevent them from appraising that evidence properly.”).  For a more 
charitable view of juries – arguing essentially that judges are no better than juries – see Richard A. Posner, An 
Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1494 (1999) (“The point is less that we need 
rules of evidence because we have juries than that we have no mechanism for enforcing rules of evidence against 
judges.”).   
At least one scholar argues that Rules 403, 408, 608, and 613 also rest on saving litigation time and money. 
John Leubsdorf, Presuppositions of Evidence Law, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1209, 1211 (2005-2006) (“Efforts to limit the 
cost and delay of litigation may exclude relevant evidence”).  If so, then this rationale raises constitutional 
concerns.  See generally, Kenneth S. Klein, Why Federal Rule of Evidence 403 is Unconstitutional, and Why That 
Matters, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 1077 (2013). 
56  As the American Law Institute (“ALI”) reported in promulgating its first Model Code of Evidence, “The 
low intellectual capacity of the jury is commonly put forward to justify some, if not all, of our exclusionary rules. . 
. . [J]urors are treated as if they were low grade morons.”  EDMOND M. MORGAN, FOREWORD TO MODEL CODE OF 
EVID., at 8-10 (1942).  Accord GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE PROOF OF GUILT: A STUDY OF THE ENGLISH 
CRIMINAL JURY TRIAL 271 (3rd. ed.) (1963) (it is somewhat of an understatement to describe the jury as “twelve 
people of average ignorance”). 
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Other Reasons”).57  This rule does exactly what its title suggests – it 
excludes relevant evidence that a judge believes the jury cannot properly 
evaluate.  Perhaps a little less directly, that is also the underlying concern 
of:  
• The character evidence rules: 
o Rules 404-406 (“Character Evidence; Crimes or 
Other Acts;” “Methods of Proving Character;” and 
“Habit; Routine Practice”);58  
• The closely-related impeachment rules:  
o Rules 608-610 (“A Witness’s Character for 
Truthfulness or Untruthfulness;” “Impeachment by 
Evidence of a Criminal Conviction;” and “Religious 
Beliefs or Opinions”) and  
o Rule 806 (“Attacking and Supporting the Declarant’s 
Credibility”);59  
• And the rules for who can be a witness:  
o Rule 602 (“Need for Personal Knowledge”),  
o Rule 603 (“Oath or Affirmation to Testify 
Truthfully”),  
o Rule 605 (“Judge’s Competency as a Witness”), and 
o Rule 606 (“Juror’s Competency as a Witness”).60  
                                                
57 FED. R. EVID. 403.   
58  FED. R. EVID. 404, 405, & 406.  See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 
51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1526 (1999) (“The principal concern with this class of evidence …. is the danger that a 
jury will give it too much weight ….”).  At common law, the use of character evidence was generally discouraged 
because of these concerns.  See Michael v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948).  The Advisory Committee 
noted that character evidence: 
 
. . . tends to distract the trier of fact from the main question of what actually happened 
on the particular occasion.  It subtly permits the trier of fact to reward the good man [and] 
to punish the bad man because of their respective characters despite what the evidence in 
the case shows actually happened. 
 
FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s note.  The Advisory Committee recognized that evidence of specific 
instances of conduct to prove character “possesses the greatest capacity to arouse prejudice, to confuse, to 
surprise, and to consume time,” and consequently, Rule 405 limits the use of this kind of evidence to cases in 
which character is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense.  FED. R. EVID. 405 advisory committee’s 
note. 
59  FED. R. EVID. 608, 609, 610 & 806.  [The exceptions to the general rule against character evidence for 
propensity purposes are sharply drawn, both in terms of the type of evidence allowed and the manner in which 
such evidence may be introduced.  For example, Rule 608(a), which allows for impeachment by reputation or 
opinion evidence, is “strictly limited to character for veracity” to “sharpen relevancy, to reduce surprise, waste of 
time, and confusion.”  FED. R. EVID. 608 advisory committee’s note.  Rules 608(b), 609, and 806 have similar 
safeguards, in addition to the “overriding protection of Rule 403.”  Id.  Rule 610 forecloses impeachment by an 
inquiry into religious beliefs, because “evidence of atheism is irrelevant to the question of credibility.”  1 GEORGE 
E. DIX ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 46 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006). 
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Each either is a requirement of a predicate for witness testimony 
(believing the jury is incapable of seeing the weakness of the evidence in 
the absence of the predicate), or keeping evidence out due to concerns that 
the jury will put too much stock in it.  Rules 413 (“Similar Crimes in 
Sexual-Assault Cases”), 414 (“Similar Crimes in Child-Molestation 
Cases”), and 415 (“Similar Acts in Civil Cases Involving Sexual Assault or 
Child Molestation”) also fall within this class of rules in that each exists to 
reverse the function of Rule 404 in particular cases.61 
And perhaps most surprisingly, the same concern -- that juries will 
misunderstand, be confused by, or improperly weigh certain kinds of 
evidence -- animates the rules on hearsay and opinion evidence.  Hearsay 
rules62 all codify the concern that juries will not properly weigh second-
hand (or worse) information.63  Rules on opinion evidence64 all codify the 
concern that juries will either be unable to discern fact from opinion or will 
over weigh expert opinions.65 
                                                                                                                       
60  FED. R. EVID. 602, 603, 605, & 606.  The requirements that a witness have first-hand knowledge of the 
matter to which he testifies and take an oath or affirmation to testify truthfully are the only express competency 
requirements provided by the Federal Rules of Evidence.  1 GEORGE E. DIX ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 
62 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006).  Rule 602 reflects the common law’s insistence on the most reliable 
source of information.  FED. R. EVID. 602 advisory committee’s note; 1 GEORGE E. DIX ET AL., MCCORMICK ON 
EVIDENCE § 10 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006).  Rule 603 goes hand-in-hand with the prohibition on inquiry 
into a witness’s religious beliefs.  See FED. R. EVID. 603 advisory committee’s note.  The presiding judge is 
deemed not competent to testify because of the concern that a testifying judge cannot “in a jury trial, avoid 
conferring his seal of approval on one side in the eyes of the jury.”  FED. R. EVID. 605 advisory committee’s note.  
Similar considerations justify precluding a juror from testifying as a witness before the other jurors.  FED. R. EVID. 
606 advisory committee’s note. 
61  FED. R. EVID. 413, 414 & 415.  Rules 413 through 415 were added as part of the Violent Crime Control 
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, the largest crime bill in United States history.  Pub. L. 103-322, § 320935, 108 
Stat. 2135.   In the early 1990’s, media attention on perpetrators of sexual crimes escaping convictions on 
“technicalities” incited public outrage, which prompted Congress to respond by giving prosecutors the power to 
introduce evidence of past sexual crimes.  Jeffrey Waller, Comment, Federal Rules of Evidence 413–415: “Laws 
are Like Medicine; They Generally Cure an Evil by a Lesser . . . Evil”, 30 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1503, 1506–07 
(1999).  The Rules’ supports in Congress argued that Rule 404’s presumption against such evidence should be 
reversed in cases involving rape or child molestation, because the nature of such crimes made such evidence more 
probative and reliable.  See, e.g. 140 CONG. REC. H2433 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1994) (statement of Rep. McCollum) 
(arguing that the past conduct of a person with a history of sexual crime provides evidence that he or she has the 
unique combination of aggressive and sexual impulses that motivates the commission of such crimes, and the lack 
of inhibitions against acting on these impulses). 
62  FED R. EVID. 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, & 807.  
63  See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1530 
(1999); John Leubsdorf, Presuppositions of Evidence Law, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1209, 1227-1228, 1249 (2005-2006); 
LAURENCE TRIBE, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957 (1974); JUSTIN SEVIER, Testing Tribe’s 
Triangle: Juries, Hearsay, and Psychological Distance, 103 GEO. L.J. 879, 890-893 (2015).  The rule against 
hearsay reflects the concern that the jury, which, historically, transformed from a group of persons with special 
knowledge of the facts to a group with no private information, should receive facts only from persons with first-
hand knowledge of them.  5 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, § 
802.02 (Joseph M. McLaughlin, ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 2014).  Thus, the rule and its exceptions keep from 
the jury evidence that lacks reliability.  See FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note (noting that the 
exception “proceeds upon the theory that under appropriate circumstances a hearsay statement may possess 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to justify nonproduction of the declarant in person at the 
trial”). 
64  FED R. EVID. 701, 702, 703, 704, & 705.   
65  See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1536 
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The rules of evidence are not explicitly limited in applicability to 
jury trials.  But we can be comfortable that nonetheless this set of rules is a 
codified view of the competencies of jurors. Courts allude to the point.66  
Scholars report it.67  Reference to the point is made in the drafting history of 
the proposed Model Code of Evidence, the predecessor to the Federal Rules 
of Evidence.68 
Further, we can look to whether the same exclusionary rules are 
present in administrative courts, which are non-jury adjudications.  The set 
of exclusionary rules detailed above are not imposed on the administrative 
courts.  In 1942 the iconic administrative law scholar, Kenneth Culp Davis, 
published a piece in the Harvard Law Review that directly addressed the 
role of evidence rules in administrative hearings -- he argued such rules 
largely were unnecessary, primarily because administrative hearings were 
not jury trials.69 Professor Davis did not go so far as to argue that rules 
excluding hearsay and opinion had no place in administrative hearings, but 
did argue that firsthand testimony should be preferred unless it was 
“inconvenient,” administrative hearing officers should not place “too much 
reliance” on opinion evidence, and administrative courts should “prefer” 
                                                                                                                       
(1999).   “The basic approach to opinions, law and expert, in these rules is to admit them when helpful to the trier 
of fact.”  FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee’s note.  Rules 703 and 704 allow experts to testify on matters of 
which they have no firsthand knowledge, base their testimony on facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible, 
and, except in criminal cases, opine on ultimate issues.  In addition, the jury “may view an expert witness as an 
‘objective authority figure more knowledgeable and credible than the typical lay witness,’ and because an expert 
necessarily testifies about a subject that is beyond the common knowledge of the jury, the jury is not as well 
equipped to question the reliability of the expert’s opinion.”  Harvey Brown & Melissa Davis, Eight Gates for 
Expert Witnesses: Fifteen Years Later, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 4 (2014) (quoting In re Christus Spohn Hosp. 
Kleberg, 222 S.W.3d 434, 440 (Tex. 2007)); see also FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (1991) 
(“When the evidence relates to highly technical matters and each side has shopped for experts favorable to its 
position, it is naïve to expect the jury to be capable of assessing the validity of dramatically opposed testimony.”).  
The Rules reflect these considerations in that they require the judge to play the role of a “gatekeeper” of expert 
opinion, to ensure that the jury is not presented with unreliable or misleading expert testimony.  Brown & Davis, 
supra, at 4.  But for purposes of the thesis proposed here – that what counts as a fact in trials is different from 
what colloquially is a fact – is inescapably exemplified by Rule 703, which allows an expert opinion to rely on 
facts inadmissible as trial evidence. 
66 Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. ___ , 132 S.Ct. 2221, 2234-2235 (2012) (“Modern rules of evidence 
continue to permit experts to express opinions based on facts about which they lack personal knowledge.... Under 
both the Illinois and the Federal Rules of Evidence, an expert may base an opinion on facts that are ‘made known 
to the expert at or before the hearing,’ but such reliance does not constitute admissible evidence of this underlying 
information…. Accordingly, in jury trials, both Illinois and federal law generally bar an expert from disclosing 
such inadmissible evidence. In bench trials, however, both the Illinois and the Federal Rules place no restriction 
on the revelation of such information to the factfinder. When the judge sits as the trier of fact, it is presumed that 
the judge will understand the limited reason for the disclosure of the underlying inadmissible information and will 
not rely on that information for any improper purpose”  (citations omitted).). 
67 See, e.g., Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Rules of Evidence for Nonjury Cases, 50 A.B.A. J. 723, 
724 (1964).   
68 The report of the ALI Proceedings considering the final draft of the Model Code of Evidence quoted the 
Honorable Augustus Hand as saying that he had “taken pride” that he had tried cases for thirteen years without 
knowing the technicalities of the rules of evidence.  E.M. Morgan, Discussion of Code of Evidence Proposed 
Final Draft, 19 A.L.I. PROC. 74, 225 (1942) (remarks of Augustus Hand).  
69  See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 
371-374, 416-423 (1942). 
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sworn to unsworn evidence.70  Put another way, administrative hearing 
officers should have the discretion to consider any evidence they wanted to.  
The Administrative Procedures Act (first codified four years after Professor 
Davis’s article) provides, “Any oral or documentary evidence may be 
received, but the agency as a matter of policy shall provide for the exclusion 
of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence.”71  This is a 
codification of the position argued by Professor Davis – that in the absence 
of juries there is no need to exclude weak but relevant evidence from 
consideration.72 
Finally, we can softly confirm the “derogatory” premise of the Rules 
of Evidence by looking at other countries.  Countries with no jury trials 
generally do not exclude hearsay or character evidence.73  Countries with a 
crimped scope of right to jury trial only exclude such evidence in jury 
trials.74   
So we can have some confidence in the assertion that many of the 
Rules of Evidence – and most dramatically all of the hearsay rules, 
character evidence rules, and rules on opinion testimony -- are grounded in 
a derogatory view of juries.75  While this set of rules intuitively would seem 
to impair the accuracy of fact finding at trial, these rules are an attempt to 
                                                
70 Id. at 376-77.  Accord, Ernest Gellhorn, Rules of Evidence and Official Notice in Formal Administrative 
Hearings, 1971 DUKE L. J. 1, 5 (1971) (“Since many of the rules governing the admission of proof in judicial 
trials are designed to protect the jury from unreliable and possibly confusing evidence, the rules need not be 
applied with the same vigor in proceedings solely before a judge or trial examiner.”).. 
71  5 U.S.C. 556(d). 
72  See Ernest Gellhorn, Rules of Evidence and Official Notice in Formal Administrative Hearings, 1971 
DUKE L. J. 1, 8 (1971). 
73  The technical treatments of hearsay and character evidence vary.  In most countries without a jury system, 
there are simply no rules addressing hearsay or character evidence at all.  See Daniel Pulecio-Boek, The 
Genealogy of Prosecutorial Discretion in Latin America: A Comparative and Historical Analysis of the 
Adversarial Reforms in the Region, 13 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 67, 100–01 (2014) (noting that virtually no 
Latin American evidence code includes rules regarding character or hearsay evidence); see generally Mirjan R. 
Damaska, Propensity Evidence in Continental Legal Systems, YALE FAC. SCHOLARSHIP SERIES, Paper 1579 
(1995), available at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers_1579.  Other codes express a preference for 
non-hearsay when it is available, but do not exclude hearsay.  E.g., STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [CODE OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], Apr. 7, 1987, BUNDESGESETZBLATT 1319, as amended, § 250 (Ger.); Decreto No. 189-
84, Codigo de Procedimientos Penales [Code of Criminal Procedure], art. 199 (Hond.).  Several countries have 
rules barring hearsay and/or character evidence, but the codified exceptions generally give the judge discretion to 
admit such evidence and thus swallow up the rule.  E.g., Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 § 3 (S. 
Afr.); Evidence Act, 1967, §§ 34–39 (Tanz.).  A handful of countries without jury systems limit hearsay and 
character only in criminal trials.  See Appendix to this Article.  But rules subjecting hearsay and/or character 
evidence to more scrutiny in criminal cases are probably “rooted as much in due process values as [they are] in the 
desire to project the adjudicator from unreliable information.”  MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 15 
(1997).  Accord, Alex Stein, Inefficient Evidence, 66 ALA. L. REV. 423, 428 (2015).  
74  England, Scotland , and Jamaica are examples of this.  See Appendix to this Article.  In the case of South 
Korea, the advent of the criminal jury in 2008 was accompanied by the introduction of rules excluding hearsay 
and other unfairly prejudicial evidence.  Ryan Y. Park, The Globalizing Jury Trial: Lessons and Insights from 
Korea, AM. J. INT’L L. 525, 554 (2010). 
75 There is growing empirical evidence that the derogatory view of juries is not supportable.  See, e.g., 
JUSTIN SEVIER, Testing Tribe’s Triangle: Juries, Hearsay, and Psychological Distance, 103 GEO. L.J. 879, 890-
893, 922-924 (2015). 
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increase the likelihood that a trial outcome will correspond to what actually 
happened. 
4. Evidence Rules Intentionally Compromising the 
Likelihood of Accurate Results 
Having dealt with procedural/administrative rules and juror-
capability rules, what remains is a set of rules intentionally excluding 
relevant evidence on the grounds that it will impair accurate determinations 
at trial.  In other words, these rules are not attempting to increase the 
likelihood that a trial outcome will correspond to what actually happened.  
Rather, these rules make the exact opposite choice – these rules keep out 
evidence that does bear on determining what happened, and do so on the 
assumption that while such evidence would be helpful, there nonetheless are 
valid reasons to ignore it. 
The first of these rules is found in Article IV of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.  Here we find rules constructed to alter the conduct and decisions 
of persons and/or entities external to the parties in trial.76  To illustrate: 
Assume action “X” is considered a preferred choice, but if actor A does X 
and if B sues A, then A’s trial opponent B might gain advantage at trial by 
showing that A did X.  These Article IV rules, in order to encourage A to do 
X, prohibit B from at trial introducing evidence that A did X. 
For example, consider the rule excluding settlement offers from 
evidence.  We want cases to settle.  We do not want people to hesitate to 
make settlement offers for fear that if the case does not settle, the offer will 
be seen as a tacit admission of liability.  Therefore, to incentivize people to 
make settlement offers, the rules provide that generally a party cannot argue 
at trial that their opponent’s offer of settlement is a tacit admission.  This 
rule and its philosophical siblings are:  
• Rule 407 (“Subsequent Remedial Measures”),  
• Rule 408 (“Compromise Offers and Negotiations”),  
• Rule 409 (“Offers to Pay Medical and Similar Expenses”),  
• Rule 410 (“Pleas, Plea Discussions, and Related 
Statements”),  
• Rule 411 (“Liability Insurance”), and  
                                                
76 Rules 407 through 411 each promote a socially valuable activity by protecting those who engage in that 
activity from evidence that might be used against them.  DEBORAH JONES MERRITT & RIC SIMMONS, LEARNING 
EVIDENCE: FROM THE FEDERAL RULES TO THE COURTROOM (3rd ed.) 88 (West 2015).   
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• Rule 412 (“Sex-Offense Cases: The Victim’s Sexual 
Behavior or Pre-dispositions”).77 
A related set of doctrines is found in the law of privileges.  
Privileges recognize certain relationships that society values and that may 
not fully function except in an environment of trust and confidence.78  As a 
result, privileges work to keep out of evidence “extremely probative” and 
“reliable” information.79  For reasons unrelated to evidence doctrine,80 the 
Federal Rules of Evidence do not codify a comprehensive list of privileges, 
but nonetheless do recognize the notion of privileges in Rules 501 
(“Privilege in General”) and 502 (“Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-
Product; Limitations on Waiver”).81  The privileges currently and 
                                                
77  FED. R. EVID. 407, 408, 409, 410, 411 & 412.  See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law 
of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1527-1529 (1999).  The bar on evidence of subsequent remedial measures to 
prove negligence or culpable conduct “rests on a social policy of encouraging people to take, or at least not 
discouraging them from taking, steps in furtherance of added safety.”  FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee’s 
note.  Similarly, the purpose of Rule 408 “is to encourage settlements which would be discouraged if such 
evidence were admissible.”  S. Rep. No. 93-1277 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7056.  The 
considerations underlying Rule 409, which bars evidence of offers to pay medical expenses, “parallel those 
underlying Rules 407 and 408.”  FED. R. EVID. 409 advisory committee’s notes.  Similarly, Rule 411 advances the 
important social policy of encouraging individuals and organizations to obtain liability insurance.  MERRITT & 
SIMMONS, supra, at 150.  Rule 410 advances the social interest in plea bargaining and reflects the reality that the 
criminal judicial system could not function if every case went to trial.  Id. at 135.  Rule 412 “encourages victims 
of sexual misconduct to institute and to participate in legal proceedings against alleged offenders.”  FED. R. EVID. 
412 advisory committee’s note.  Accord John Leubsdorf, Evidence Law as a System of Incentives, 95 IOWA L. 
REV. 1621 (2009-2010). 
78  See DEBORAH JONES MERRITT & RIC SIMMONS, LEARNING EVIDENCE: FROM THE FEDERAL RULES TO 
THE COURTROOM (3rd ed.) 826-28 (West 2015).   
79  DEBORAH JONES MERRITT & RIC SIMMONS, LEARNING EVIDENCE: FROM THE FEDERAL RULES TO THE 
COURTROOM (3rd ed.) 826 (West 2015).  Accord, Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems in the 
Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 384 (1942) (privileges “obstruct the search for truth in order to 
promote certain extrinsic policies ….”); CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 100-01 (4th ed. 
1992) (“Rather than facilitating the illumination of the truth, [privileges] shut out the light.”). 
80 Congress considered the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence during the “Watergate” scandals, which 
soured Congress on codification of privileges.  See DEBORAH JONES MERRITT & RIC SIMMONS, LEARNING 
EVIDENCE: FROM THE FEDERAL RULES TO THE COURTROOM (3rd ed.) 829 (West 2015). 
81  FED. R. EVID. 501 & 502.  The original proposal by the Advisory Committee had thirteen privileges, but 
got caught up in the then broader controversy of Watergate and privilege; Congress did not adopt the original 
proposal on privileges.  See DEBORAH JONES MERRITT & RIC SIMMONS, LEARNING EVIDENCE: FROM THE 
FEDERAL RULES TO THE COURTROOM (THIRD EDITION) at 829 (West Academic 2015). The proposed Article V 
submitted to Congress contained thirteen rules: one provided that only those privileges set forth in Article V or in 
some other Act of Congress could be recognized by the federal courts, nine defined specific privileges, and three 
addressed issues of waiver.  Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 230–61 
(1972) (Proposed Rules 501–513).  The Judiciary Committee amended Article V, eliminating all of the specific 
rules on privilege in favor of Rule 501, which provides that privilege is governed by the common law, the United 
States Constitution, federal law, and rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.  The rationale underlying the 
amendment was that federal law should not supersede state law in substantive areas such as privilege absent a 
compelling reason.  H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 8–9 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7083.  Some 
scholars suggest that the original proposal by the Advisory Committee got caught up in the then broader 
controversy of Watergate and privilege.  See DEBORAH JONES MERRITT & RIC SIMMONS, LEARNING EVIDENCE: 
FROM THE FEDERAL RULES TO THE COURTROOM (THIRD EDITION) at 829 (West Academic 2015).  In 2008  the 
Advisory Committee proposed and Congress enacted Rule 502, which provides for limitations on waiver of the 
attorney-client privilege and work product protection, in response to longstanding disputes in the courts about the 
effect of certain disclosures of protected information and complaints about prohibitively high litigation costs 
necessary to protect against waiver.  FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note. 
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unambiguously recognized in federal courts are the right against self-
incrimination, the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-product 
privilege, the spousal testimonial and spousal confidences privileges, the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege, executive privilege, and clergy 
communicant privilege.82  There is a recognized but less defined state 
secrets privilege,83 and some support for a journalist-source privilege.84 
Some States also recognize physician-patient privilege and intra-family 
privileges beyond spouses.85  Each of these privileges conceptually is a 
choice that evidence in a particular dispute will be excluded in order to 
effect the choices made by persons external to the dispute (the generic set of 
future clients, spouses, patients, journalist sources, penitents, etc.).86   
A third set of exclusions of relevant evidence for non-accuracy 
reasons are procedural exclusions.  In these instances – primarily exclusion 
of improperly gathered evidence in criminal cases,87 and exclusion due to 
discovery abuse in civil cases88 -- again evidence is excluded not because 
the admission of the evidence may distort the chances of reaching an 
accurate result, but despite the fact that the exclusion may do so.89  The 
decision is made that because of the way the police (mis)behaved, or 
because of the way the lawyer (mis)behaved, we must incentivize future 
better behavior, even if the cost is the distorted outcome of the trial at hand. 
Finally, there is exclusion of evidence for reasons of time and 
money.  Here, we return to Federal Rules 403 and 611, both of which allow 
exclusion of relevant evidence because it is too time consuming or 
repetitive.90 
                                                
82  See DEBORAH JONES MERRITT & RIC SIMMONS, LEARNING EVIDENCE: FROM THE FEDERAL RULES TO 
THE COURTROOM (3rd ed.) 830-831 (West 2015).   
83  See generally Amanda Frost, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1931 (2007). 
84  See DEBORAH JONES MERRITT & RIC SIMMONS, LEARNING EVIDENCE: FROM THE FEDERAL RULES TO 
THE COURTROOM (3rd ed.) 831-832 (West 2015).   
85  See DEBORAH JONES MERRITT & RIC SIMMONS, LEARNING EVIDENCE: FROM THE FEDERAL RULES TO 
THE COURTROOM (3rd ed.) 832 (West 2015).   
86  See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1530-
1532 (1999). 
87  See generally Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, 8 
AM. BAR FNDTN. RESEAERCH J.  585 (1983); Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (And Still Need 
to Learn) About the “Costs” of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of “Lost” Arrests, 8 AM. 
BAR FNDTN. RESEAERCH J. 611 (1983). 
88  See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 37 (“If a party or a party's officer, director, or managing agent … fails to obey an 
order to provide or permit discovery… the court where the action is pending may issue further just orders. They 
may include the following: (i) directing that the matters embraced in the order or other designated facts be taken 
as established for purposes of the action, as the prevailing party claims; (ii) prohibiting the disobedient party from 
supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses, or from introducing designated matters in evidence….”). 
89  See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (“[T]he purpose of the exclusionary rule ‘is to deter--to 
compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way--by removing the incentive to 
disregard it.”’) (internal citations omitted). 
90  FED. R. EVID. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially 
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As with jury-derogation evidence rules, excluding concededly 
relevant evidence for extra-trial accuracy reasons is a counter-intuitive 
definition of what counts as a fact in courts.  And so as a check that one is 
not too precipitously interpreting what American courts are doing, we again 
can look for at least soft confirmation from the courts of other countries.  
We can ask: do other countries also recognize privileges and the like, 
thereby excluding concededly relevant evidence? And when we do so, our 
definition again is confirmed – countries around the world routinely and 
intentionally exclude from evidence information that would advance the 
likelihood that a trial outcome will correspond to what actually happened.91  
In other words, globally courts are comfortable occasionally subjugating 
trial accuracy to other values. They do not see this as inconsistent with the 
role of public courts. 
5. Conclusions About What Courts Count as “Facts” 
What now can we conclude about what counts as a “fact” in court?  
Relevant evidence counts as a fact subject to two limitations. First, a 
relevant fact must be within the evaluative skill set of our preconceived 
notions of juror competence.  Second, a relevant fact must not promote a 
defined set of undesirable behaviors external to the trial. 
As Judge Richard Posner cautions, “it is important to note that the 
formal rules only codify a fraction of the law of evidence.”92  But the other 
                                                                                                                       
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: … undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting 
cumulative evidence.”); FED. R. EVID. 611 (“The court should exercise reasonable control over the mode and 
order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence so as to: …avoid wasting time”). 
91 Evidentiary privileges are examples of “[r]ules rejecting probative information for the sake of values 
unrelated to the pursuit of truth.”  MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 12–13 (1997) (noting that 
testimonial privileges are widespread in continental Europe and often broader than the common law privileges).  
Some form of the attorney-client privilege exists in nearly every country examined in Appendix A to this Article.  
See, e.g., Code of Criminal Procedure art. 159(b), Fletorja zyrtate Nos. 5–7 (1995) (Alb.); Criminal Procedure 
Code art. 65(4) (Arm.); Commonwealth Evidence Act 1995 s 118–119 (Austrl.); Codigo Penal [Criminal Code] §§ 
246–247 (Chile); Civil Procedure Act (Law No. 547, 1960, as last amended by Law No. 9171, 2008) art. 315 (R. 
O. Korea); Code of Judicial Procedure, 36:3 (Swed.); Evidence Act, 1967, §§ 134–137 (Tanz.); CMUK. m. 46 
[Code of Criminal Procedure art. 46] (Turk.); Civil Evidence Act § 8 (Zimbabwe).  The spousal/familial 
privileges is just as widespread.  E.g., Code of Civil Procedure art. 566, Fletorja zyrtare Nos. 9–11 (1996) (Alb.); 
Code of Criminal Procedure art. 158, Fletorja zyrtate Nos. 5–7 (1995) (Alb.); Criminal Procedure Code art. 20(1) 
(Arm.); ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], Dec. 5, 2005, BUNDESGESETZBLATT 3202, 
as amended, § 383(1)–(3) (Ger.); Civil Procedure Act (Law No. 547, 1960, as last amended by Law No. 9171, 
2008) art. 314 (R. O. Korea); Code of Judicial Procedure, 36:3 (Swed.); Evidence Act, 1967, §§ 130–131 (Tanz.); 
CMUK. m 45 [Code of Criminal Procedure art. 45] (Turk.); Civil Evidence Act § 6 (Zimbabwe).  In South Africa, 
judges have “wide discretion to permit [a witness] to refuse to disclose information where disclosure would be a 
breach of some ethical or social value and nondisclosure would be unlikely to result in serious injustice in the 
particular case in which it is claimed.”  L. H. HOFFMAN & D. T. ZEFFERT, THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW OF 
EVIDENCE 266–67 (4th ed. 1988). But see Jenia Iontcheva Turner, The Exclusionary Rule As a Symbol of the Rule 
of Law, 67 SMU L. REV. 821, 822-829 (2014) (reporting on the spread of the criminal exclusionary rule 
internationally in new democracies as a check on government abuse and a symbol of democracy). 
92  Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1517 (1999). 
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evidence rules Judge Posner has in mind – such as res ipsa loquitur – are 
not matters of defining facts but rather are ways to resolve disputes by 
approaches other than gathering of facts.93  For our purposes, these other 
rules are at most tangential to the ideas of this Article. 
So what we learn from better understanding “justification” in courts 
– or what counts as a fact – is that correct outcomes are not the be all and 
end all of public courts.  Or put another way, “justification” in courts means 
the relevant facts both within the evaluative skills of jurors’ competence and 
that do not promote defined undesirable behaviors external to the trial 
Finally, it bears at least brief acknowledgement and discussion that 
if we depart from the concrete settings of courtrooms and return to the 
theoretical context of epistemology, then defining “justification” as 
dependent on external assumptions is philosophically problematic.  
Applying nuanced philosophical terminology somewhat crudely, the rules 
of evidence are an example of an inferential justification that is an epistemic 
regression – knowledge formed from justified belief inferred from other 
knowledge formed from justified belief.94  The rules of evidence avoid the 
absurdity of an infinite epistemic regression by providing a foundation for 
this otherwise bottomless inquiry – the rules define a set of information that 
a fact finder by fiat is empowered to believe as true, and thus is justified in 
inferring knowledge from. But in doing so, the rules of evidence create their 
own absurdity, because the foundation is defined as incomplete (relevant 
evidence is excluded) and hence inaccurate – the rules define a path to 
“truth” that intentionally is not the whole truth.  This argument in its most 
abstract form is the basis of skepticism in philosophy of  “foundationalism” 
explanations of “justification.”95  
                                                
93   Id. 
94  See Richard Fumerton & Ali Hasan, Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification, THE STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Summer 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-
bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=justep-foundational (“the vast majority of the propositions we know or 
justifiably believe have that status only because we know or justifiably believe other different propositions”). 
95  See generally, KEITH LEHRER, THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE, SECOND EDITION 15-18 (Westview Press 2000). 
Accord Richard Fumerton & Ali Hasan, Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification, THE STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Summer 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-
bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=justep-foundational (“If all justification were inferential then for someone S 
to be justified in believing some proposition P, S must be in a position to legitimately infer it from some other 
proposition E1. But E1 could justify S in believing P only if S were justified in believing E1, and if all 
justification were inferential the only way for S to do that would be to infer it from some other proposition 
justifiably believed, E2, a proposition which in turn would have to be inferred from some other proposition E3 
which is justifiably believed, and so on, ad infinitum. But finite beings cannot complete an infinitely long chain of 
reasoning and so if all justification were inferential no-one would be justified in believing anything at all to any 
extent whatsoever. This most radical of all skepticisms is absurd (it entails that one couldn't even be justified in 
believing it) and so there must be a kind of justification which is not inferential, i.e., there must be 
noninferentially justified beliefs which terminate regresses of justification.”).  This is the coherentist attack on 
foundationalist theories of justification.  
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That is a mouthful.  But for purposes of understanding 
“justification” in courts – the “problem” can be stated more accessibly: the 
rules of evidence have to make assumptions about what could be true in 
order to evaluate what is true. That is epistemologically problematic. But it 
is less problematic for the more concrete context of “justification” in courts, 
in part due to the insight that correct trial judgments are not the only 
concern of the courts. 
C. Understanding “Knowledge” in Courts  
Recall that when we began this discussion, we defined “knowledge” 
as an intuitive form of certainty.  Put another way, it is when one has 
collected a sufficient quantum and quality of information that one feels 
comfortable ending the information gathering function and is willing to act. 
Courts are information-gathering, decision-making endeavors.  Any 
information-gathering, decision-making endeavor has rules for what quality 
of information it is willing to consider, and for when it has enough quantum 
of information collected such that collection can end and action can begin.   
Consider, for example, the different approaches of a research 
physician and a treating physician.  A research physician – or for that 
matter, any bench scientist in any hard science discipline – primarily is 
trying to advance pure knowledge, and so paramount is that an experiment 
is sufficiently rigorously designed that its results are reliable.96  Thus, a 
research scientist considers data that can be derived from a properly 
structured, double blind experiment.  A research scientist acts – is willing to 
move on to the next task -- if the result can be replicated.  On the other 
hand, a treating physician – in response to the necessity of addressing 
patient health – has very different notions of what to consider as a basis to 
act, and when to act. Data worthy of consideration is any symptom, 
regardless of its vagueness or source or likelihood.  The decision-making 
metric is the “differential diagnosis,”97 under which the physician may treat 
a more dangerous albeit less probable explanation first.98   
                                                
96 Accord John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Justice, 66 CAL. L. REV. 541, 541-542 (1978) 
(arguing objective truth is best suited to scientific inquiries, while courts are better suited to distributive justice). 
97  See generally, “differential diagnosis,” GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE (2008). 
98 Louis Kaplow uses the example of a treating doctor to rhetorically demonstrate why legal systems pay too 
little attention to decisional rules – he argues that in important medical decisions we would never use a 
preponderance of evidence standard.  Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 YALE L. J. 738, 745 (2012).  The 
inference is that in medical decisions – where the stakes often can be higher than in civil litigation -- the 
decisional rule would have to be more stringent.  Under the differential diagnosis approach, however, the initial 
treatment may be addressing something even less likely than 50/50.  And that is the point – different systems have 
different decision rules in response to different system needs. 
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Thought of this way, “knowledge” in courts – or the acceptable 
degree of “probability” – is a determination about the primacy of 
“accuracy.” 
 1. Knowledge as Accuracy 
At the 2015 Annual Meeting of the American Association of Law 
Schools, the Criminal Justice Section presented a distinguished panel 
addressing the ways in which the criminal justice system fell short of being 
“just” or “fair” because of the system’s apparently insufficient devotion to 
discerning the “truth” with  “accuracy.”99 An underlying assumption of the 
entire panel was that guilt or innocence, at least in a serious criminal case, 
could – and should – be determined accurately no matter the procedural 
burden or the stage of the litigation.100  
The panelists all conceded that whatever they thought should be the 
primacy of accuracy, the United States Supreme Court unambiguously has 
promoted finality over accuracy.101  In other words, the jurisprudence of the 
Court plainly holds that if a trial has been procedurally sufficient, the fact 
that the verdict could be more accurate is not a reason to reopen the matter.  
Or put yet another way, even those who believe accuracy is attainable 
concede that the courts do not adopt it as a primary value. 
The moderator of the AALS Panel – Professor Dan Simon – has 
written in detail on the value of “accuracy” in the American courts.102  In 
his book, Simon puzzles over the jurisprudence of the United States 
Supreme Court -- “One of the most bewildering and underappreciated 
features of the criminal justice process is the low value it assigns to the 
accuracy of its factual determinations or, in the legal parlance, to the 
discovery of truth.”103  As Simon details, the system regularly allows 
process to trump accuracy. 
                                                
99  Criminal Justice – Reprioritizing Accuracy As The Primary Goal Of The Criminal Justice System, AALS 
2015 Annual Meeting (January 5, 2015), available with Login password at  https://soundcloud.com/aals-
2/criminal-justice-reprioritizing-accuracy-as-the-primary-goal-of-the-criminal-justice-system/s-YH7ve. 
100 Criminal Justice – Reprioritizing Accuracy As The Primary Goal Of The Criminal Justice System, AALS 
2015 Annual Meeting (January 5, 2015), available with Login password at  https://soundcloud.com/aals-
2/criminal-justice-reprioritizing-accuracy-as-the-primary-goal-of-the-criminal-justice-system/s-YH7ve. 
101 Criminal Justice – Reprioritizing Accuracy As The Primary Goal Of The Criminal Justice System, AALS 
2015 Annual Meeting (January 5, 2015), available with Login password at  https://soundcloud.com/aals-
2/criminal-justice-reprioritizing-accuracy-as-the-primary-goal-of-the-criminal-justice-system/s-YH7ve. 
102  See DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS (Harvard Univ. 
Press 2012). 
103 DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 209 (Harvard Univ. Press 
2012). 
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It is one thing to disagree with the Court.  It is quite another to find 
it “bewildering.” If the Court’s opinions on accuracy are “bewildering,” 
then it bears revisiting whether the Court and Professor Simon mean the 
same thing by “accuracy.”  
A quantum of information rule is the balancing point a system sets 
between its competing values of finality and certainty. As discussed supra, 
any information-gathering, decision-making endeavor has a set of rules for 
the quantum of information necessary to act.  This is the meaning of 
“accuracy” within an information-gathering, decision-making endeavor. It 
is what Professor Luke Meier describes as a “confidence principle” – the 
confidence one has in the probability of an event having occurred being 
predictive of whether the event actually occurred.104 Because absolute 
certainty is not attainable, in order to act the endeavor must at some point 
conclude it is – using a colloquial meaning of accuracy -- “accurate 
enough.”105  A complaint about the “accuracy” of an information-seeking 
endeavor is a complaint that the system has not set the threshold for 
“accurate enough” – the juncture for ending information gathering and 
turning to action -- at a correct balancing point.  Thus, the decisional rule – 
the rule for when gathering data can end and action can begin – defines a 
system’s value of “accuracy.” 
 2. Accuracy as Burdens of Proof 
Thought of this way, we can understand more clearly what the 
American courts mean by “accuracy.”  In the American courts the rules for 
quantum of information – the meaning of “accuracy” -- are the burden of 
production rules within the familiar rules for burdens of proof used as 
decisional rules: generally “preponderance of the evidence” in a civil case 
and “beyond a reasonable doubt” in a criminal case.106  Burdens set a metric 
both for acceptable probability that a decision will be correct, and how to 
make that decision (avoid a “tie”).  
                                                
104 See Luke Meier, Probability, Confidence, and the “Reasonable Jury” Standard, 84 MISS. L. J. 747, 778-
813 (2015). 
105 Accord, C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional 
Guarantees, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1295-1296 (1982) 
106 See, e.g., C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional 
Guarantees, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1293-1294 (1982). If one probes more deeply than the general contexts of 
most civil cases and most criminal cases, there are other burdens of proof.  See Ronald J. Allen & Alex Stein, 
Evidence, Probability, and the Burden of Proof, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 557, 558-559 (2013).  For purposes of this 
Paper, these nuances do not matter.  Further, the argument that some burdens of proof are constitutionally required 
– see Alex Stein, Constitutional Evidence Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 65, 79-82 (2008) -- does not matter to this 
Paper. 
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The American courts are a binomial decision system.107  In a civil 
case within each claim between each pair of parties a verdict can only be 
liable or not liable.  In a criminal case as to each charge against each 
defendant a verdict can only be guilty or not guilty. American courts reach 
decisions almost every time.108   
But even in a binomial decision system it is possible that a decision 
is not reached; rather, there is a “tie.”  Thus we must examine tiebreaking 
rules in binomial decision systems. 
While a true tie might be so unlikely as to essentially be impossible, 
if we define a “tie” simply as a close question – one where the right 
decision is not yet sufficiently determinable -- then how a system deals with 
ties is important.  Defining ties this way is not a matter of convenience, but 
rather of reality.  Trials have never been, and never will be “Bayesian”109 -- 
judges and juries do not seek to quantify experiential data and risk of error 
to mathematically determine a verdict.  The rules of courts structure a 
system that allows judges and juries to decide what probably happened in a 
case, and to be confident enough with that conclusion that a dispute can 
come to an end.110 Until that point is reached, the trial is in stasis – it is a tie. 
Now we can comfortably see how the American courts act like any 
other information-gathering endeavor.  Ties so defined create a decision 
point – the point at which reaching the right decision is less important than 
reaching some decision.  In information-gathering endeavors, as 
information is gathered there will be junctures where a decision is not yet 
considered readily determinable.  Some of these junctures are simply 
                                                
107 Not all court systems are binomial decision systems.   For example, a verdict in a criminal trial in 
Scotland gives three options: guilty, not guilty, and not proven.  See Samuel Bray, Not Proven: Introducing a 
Third Verdict, 72 CHI. L. REV. 1299 (2005); Lorraine Hope, Edith Greene, Amina Memon, Melanie Gavisk, & 
Kate Houston, A third verdict option: Exploring the option of the not proven verdict on mock juror decision 
making, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 241, 242 (2008). 
108 Hung jury rates in the United States are approximately 5% - 7%.  See HARRY KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, 
THE AMERICAN JURY 56 (Little, Brown 1966); G. Thomas Munsterman, Hung Juries: Are They a Problem 
(NCSC), http://www.ncsc-jurystudies.org/what-we-
do/~/media/microsites/files/cjs/jury%20news/hung%20juries%20are%20they%20a%20problem.ashx; George C. 
Thomas, III & Mark Greenbaum, Justice Story Cuts the Gordian Knot of Hung Jury Instructions, 15 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 893, 918 (2007); see also, Jason D. Reichelt, Standing Alone: Conformity, Coercion, and the 
Protection of the Holdout Juror, 40 MICH. J. L. REFORM 569, 582-83 (2007) (roughly two percent of federal trials 
and four-to-six percent of state trials end in hung juries). 
109 Bayes Theorem is “a theorem expressing the probability of one of a number of mutually exclusive events 
Hi, given some other event E, in terms of the probabilities of all the Hi independently of E and the probabilities of 
E given each Hi.”  OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (Oxford Univ. Press 2015). 
110  See Luke Meier, Probability, Confidence, and the Constitutionality of Summary Judgment, 42 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 1, 2 (2014) (“Stated simply, the probability inquiry requires an estimate as to the likelihood of a 
given fact being true; the confidence inquiry asks how sure one can be about a probability estimate given the 
information available.”).  See also, Neil B. Cohen, Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World 
of Imperfect Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 385 (1985). 
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moments where information gathering is early and incomplete.  Others are 
junctures where the system has gathered enough information that a decision 
could be made.  In these later instances, the system rules either will impose 
a decisional rule – a tie-breaking rule governing how to make a decision -- 
or continue with the information-gathering process.111   
In this way, decisions in trials (verdicts and judgments) are different 
from decisions described in economic decision theories.  In trials the 
decision maker (judge or jury) is different from the system participants 
controlling the quantum of information the decision will be based upon 
(attorneys and litigants).  Classic decision theory assumes decision-making 
where these roles reside in the same person/entity.112  
Subject to this distinction, burdens of proof as decisional rules not 
only are probability rules, but also are tiebreaking rules.113  In trials, the 
attorneys – subject to the gatekeeping rulings of the judge – control the 
quantum of information.114  Burdens of proof then regulate the way the 
decision maker – judge or jury – manipulates this information.   The 
decision maker does not usually – indeed, rarely can -- send the case back to 
the lawyers and say, essentially, “I need to know more.”  So the function in 
trials of burdens of proof is to force a decision – i.e., to take the possibility 
of a true tie off of the table.  It is a message to the parties – “Put into 
evidence whatever information you wish, but this is it – this dispute ends 
today.”  So in trials the mere fact of imposing a tiebreaking rule tells us 
imprecisely that in the instance of close questions, at some point the system 
values finality more than the system fears error.115  But the rules do not 
quantify when information gathering will end, because it is in the control of 
the parties, not the decision maker.  Rather, the rules provide that when 
information gathering has ended, the decision-maker must decide. 
                                                
111 See Michael Block & Jeffrey S. Parker, Decision Making in the Absence of Successful Fact Finding: 
Theory and Experimental Evidence on Adversarial Versus Inquisitorial Systems of Adjudication, 24 INT’L REV. L. 
& ECON. 89, 91 (2004) (“…burdens of proof … operate as default rules of decision for cases where revelation has 
failed.”).  A variant of this later version of a tie is when there is no further information to be gathered. 
112 See generally, Hillel J. Einhorn & Robert M. Hogarth, Behavioral Decision Theory: Processes of 
Judgment and Choice, 32 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 53 (1981); For a detailed economic analysis of this phenomena 
and its implications, see generally Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 YALE L. J. 738 (2012).  Timothy 
Williamson argues that in the strictest construction, one “cannot use decision theory as a guide to evidential 
probability.”  TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON, KNOWLEDGE AND ITS LIMITS 210 (Oxford Univ. Press 2000). 
113  See Jerome A. Hoffman & William A. Schroeder, Burdens of Proof, 38 ALA. L. REV 31, 31 (1986-1987) 
114 See Justin Sevier, The Truth-Justice Tradeoff: Perceptions of Decisional Accuracy and Procedural 
Justice in Adversarial and Inquisitorial Legal Systems, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 212, 212-213 and sources 
cited therein (2014) (because an adversarial system – in contrast to an inquisitorial system – places control of 
information outside the control of the decision maker, adversarial systems may be more poorly equipped to 
achieve objective accuracy). 
115 A compelling criticism of the balance the American courts have struck between finality and accuracy can 
be found at Laurie L. Levinson, Searching for Injustice: The Challenge of Post-Conviction Discovery, 
Investigation, and Litigation, 87. S. CAL. L. REV. 101 (2015). 
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But burdens of proof also teach us something about the views of the 
courts toward particular kinds of error.  Errors can be of two types.  Type I 
error is a false positive.  Type II error is a false negative.  Binomial decision 
systems – in setting their decisional rules – are expressing a choice 
between: (1) neutrality between Type I error and Type II error; and (2) 
preferring one type of error to the other.116 
An example of near-neutrality between Type I error and Type II 
error comes from baseball.  The baseball rule for when a ball is caught by 
the first baseman at the apparent same moment that the runner’s foot 
touches the base is the tie goes to the runner.117   The likelihood is 
essentially zero that measured even in micro-seconds there was an actual 
tie.  If we assume that instances of the runner beating the catch and 
instances of the catch beating the runner are essentially equally distributed 
along a spectrum of which came first and by how much, then to impose a 
tiebreaking rule at exactly the point of the apparently true tie, baseball 
approaches the two types of error almost neutrally.118  Baseball is as close 
as is possible – while still making a decision -- to being indifferent between 
a mistaken “safe” call and mistaken “out” call. 
An example of a system that does not view both types of error 
neutrally is a pregnancy test.  No over-the-counter pregnancy test is perfect.  
It is capable of giving a false positive or a false negative.  But “False-
positive results are not thought to be as significant a public health concern 
as false-negative results, as they should lead to a prenatal appointment and 
follow-up laboratory testing.”119  For these reasons, a pregnancy test is 
intentionally biased to produce more false positives than false negatives. 
As these examples illustrate, the nature of the tie-breaking rule of a 
system teaches us the view of a system towards particular types of error.120  
And with this in mind we see something important about the American 
courts.  The civil trial decisional rule – preponderance of the evidence – is 
                                                
116 See generally, Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 YALE L.J. 738, 740, 756 (2012). 
117 I am aware that as video technology has advanced and as Major League Baseball has adopted video 
review, the likelihood and frequency of a true tie has almost been eliminated enitrely.  But the utility of baseball 
as an example serves the purposes of this Paper, and it bears noting that there are vastly more baseball games 
played outside of Major League Baseball than within it.   
118  Baseball does not approach the two types of error exactly neutrally, as that would require either 
randomizing the beneficiary of a true tie or doing something like NCAA basketball does when two opposing team 
players simultaneously possess the ball – in the run of the game the two teams alternate the right to possession in 
the wake of a tie.  But for our purposes, baseball remains sufficiently illustrative. 
119 Lori A. Bastian, Kavita Nanda, Vic Hasselblad & David L. Simel, Diagnostic Efficiency of Home 
Pregnancy Test Kits, 7 ARCHIVES OF FAMILY MEDICINE 465-469 (1998). 
120 See generally, RICHARD A, POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 844-49 (Wolters Kluwer 9th ed. 
2014). 
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like the baseball example, a near neutral rule.121 In civil cases the system 
essentially is indifferent to who wins.122  The criminal trial decisional rule – 
beyond a reasonable doubt – is like the pregnancy tests, a strong preference 
rule, although in contrast to a pregnancy test, the preference here is for Type 
II error (a “not guilty” verdict setting a guilty person free) rather than Type I 
error (a “guilty” verdict convicting an innocent accused).123 
One more observation can tentatively be made about burdens of 
proof. The intention of burdens may not be matched by the reality.  As 
noted, the civil burden of proof is neutral between types of error.  The 
criminal burden of proof is a strong preference rule.  So if the criminal 
burden of proof functions as intended, then in the set of “Not Guilty” 
verdicts we would expect that a high percentage of acquittals are actually 
juries who conclude “not proven” rather than conclude “exoneration.” But 
there is some weak data suggesting this is not actually what is occurring.  In 
Scotland the criminal verdict form has had three options – “Guilty,” “Not 
Guilty,” and “Not Proven” -- for over 300 years.124  The verdict choice of 
“Not Proven” accounts for between 1/5 and 1/3 of all Scottish acquittals.125  
                                                
121 While he does so in the course of developing a different point, in L. Jonathan Cohen’s work addressing 
burdens of proof he posits an example of a case where the only evidence of who was a gatecrasher is that of 1000 
attendees to a rodeo, only 499 paid to get in; his example illustrates the neutrality of the civil system between the 
two types of error – as to any particular person accused of being a gatecrasher, the likelihood of Type I error is 
.501 and the likelihood of Type II error is .499, yet the system is comfortable reaching a decision.  L. JONATHAN 
COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 74-78 (Clarendon Press 1977).   
The civil justice system is not uniformly neutral between Type I and Type II error.  See generally, 
Lynn A. Stout, Type I Error, Type II Error, and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 
711 (1996). Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence arguably broadly changes the balance point in civil cases 
between Type I and Type II error, by empowering a civil trial judge to dismiss a case pre-discovery as a means of 
reducing the incidence of frivolous litigation.  See generally, Mark Anderson & Max Huffman, Iqbal, Twombly, 
and the Expected Cost of False Positive Error, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2010); Kenneth S. Klein, 
Removing the Blindfold and Tipping the Scales:  The Unintended Lesson of Ashcroft v. Iqbal is that Frivolous 
Lawsuits May be Important to Our Nation, 41 RUTGERS L. J. 593 (2010); Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey Miller, 
An Information-Forcing Approach to the Motion to Dismiss, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 437 (2013); Mark Hermann, 
James M. Beck, & Stephen B. Burbank, Plausible Denial: Should Congress Overrule Twombly and Iqbal, 158 U. 
PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 141, 146-147, 151-153 (2009). Because the Supreme Court did not discuss its rationale 
in the jargon of Type I and Type II error, however, the Court’s holdings are susceptible of at least two 
interpretations: the Court may be determining that the civil system no longer should be strictly neutral, but the 
Court also simply may be trying to correct for a system that should be neutral but that the Court believes has 
become out of balance.   
122 See Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 YALE L. J. 738, 742-44 n. 7-9 (2012). 
123 See Bruce D. Spencer, Estimating the Accuracy of Jury Verdicts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 305, 308 
(2007). See generally, Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 YALE L. J. 738, 744 n. 10 (2012).  In other words, the 
criminal justice system is premised on a decision that as a society we are willing to live with more criminals on 
the street in order to minimize the instances of incarceration of the innocent.  See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 
358, 361-364 (1970) (the reasonable doubt standard is “a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions 
resting on factual error”).  The “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard is one place we can concretely see this 
decision in action.  Cf. Matteo Rizzoli & Luca Stanca, Judicial Error and Crime Deterrence: Theory and 
Experimental Evidence, 55 J. L. & ECON. 311 (2012) (arguing that in criminal justice Type I error and Type II 
error may have equal deterrence effect). 
124 See Lorraine Hope, Edith Greene, Amina Memon, Melanie Gavisk, & Kate Houston, A third verdict 
option: Exploring the option of the not proven verdict on mock juror decision making, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
241, 242 (2008). 
125 See Lorraine Hope, Edith Greene, Amina Memon, Melanie Gavisk, & Kate Houston, A third verdict 
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While a variety of factors could explain this experience, one explanation is 
that between 66% and 80% of acquittals in Scotland are actual 
exonerations.126  And while Scotland is not the United States, and the 
differences systemically and culturally may well matter for comparative 
purposes, Scotland’s experience is at least tentative evidence raising a 
question of how well the American burdens are achieving their architectural 
purpose.  
This tentative conclusion reinforces an earlier point, which is that 
trial judgments do not mirror precisely, either in structure or behavior, the 
kinds of decisions modeled in decision theory.  It turns out that decision 
theory is a useful analog to what happens in trials, but is not a description 
of what happens in trials.  And for this reason, we can draw broad but not 
mathematically precise conclusions about the role of burdens of proof in 
trials.  Those conclusions are: The rules of the American courts express a 
preference for finality over accuracy, express a near neutral view of error in 
civil cases, and express a strong preference for Type II error in criminal 
cases.127   
It bears noting that some scholars expert in economic analysis of the 
law reject the notion that we cannot have mathematically precise 
conclusions about the role of burdens of proof in trials. There is a lot of 
contemporary discussion in the legal literature – largely taking a Bayesian 
approach128 – about refining burdens of proof either in order to function 
optimally or in order to serve system goals beyond simply being a 
                                                                                                                       
option: Exploring the option of the not proven verdict on mock juror decision making, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
241, 242 (2008). 
126 I believe the true exoneration rate in Scotland is actually between somewhat and far lower.  Here is why: 
Envision a spectrum of confidence of guilt ranging from 0% certainty of guilt (100% certainty of innocence) to 
100% certainty of guilt.  We will somewhat arbitrarily, for these purposes, assign a value of 90% of certainty guilt 
to “guilt beyond a reasonable doubt“ – the standard for conviction in a criminal trial.  “Probably guilty” versus 
“probably innocent” would break right at 50%.  So on this spectrum, “Guilty” would be the cases would from 
90%-100%.  “Probably Not Guilty” would be the cases from 0%-50%.  “Probably Guilty but Not Proven” would 
be the cases from 50%-90%.  This model would predict then that 4/9ths of acquittals – 44.44% -- would be where 
the jury is actually concluding “probably guilty but not proven.” But Scotland’s experience is that the percentage 
of acquittals through a verdict of “Not Proven” is 20%-33.33%.  There are a variety of factors that could explain 
why juries in Scotland opt for a finding of “Not Proven.”  See Lorraine Hope, Edith Greene, Amina Memon, 
Melanie Gavisk, & Kate Houston, A third verdict option: Exploring the option of the not proven verdict on mock 
juror decision making, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 241 (2008).  But all of these factors would vector toward the 
“Not Proven” rate being higher – not lower -- than the incidence of a true conclusion of “not proven.”  So I 
conclude that the true rate of acquittals because guilt was “not proven” “beyond a reasonable doubt” is higher than 
20%-33.33, and conversely the true exoneration rate is lower than 66.67%-80% of all acquittals. 
127 I will not attempt to be any more precise in my description of the role of burdens of proof in fact finding.  
I agree with Ronald Allen and Alex Stein that it is impossible to assign anything like mathematical precision to 
the nature of fact finding.  See Ronald J. Allen & Alex Stein, Evidence, Probability, and the Burden of Proof, 55 
ARIZ. L. REV. 557, 600-602 (2013).  But see, Alex Stein, Inefficient Evidence, 66 ALA. L. REV. 423 (2015) 
(arguably presenting the opposite conclusion – that fact finding can be precisely economically modeled).  
128 See, e.g., Anne W. Martin & David A. Schum, Quantifying Burdens of Proof: A Likelihood Ration 
Approach, 27 JURIMETRICS J. 383, 384-385 (1986-1987). 
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decisional rule.  Professors Bruce Hay and Kathryn Spier argue for burdens 
of proof as a means of limiting the costs of resolving a dispute.129  Professor 
Louis Kaplow proposes modifying burdens of proof to better reflect 
statistical distributions of harms and benefits related to kinds of behavior.130  
Professor Edward Cheng calls for a pure (or at least more) numerical 
approach to burdens of proof as decisional rules.131  Professors Ronald 
Allen and Alex Stein take on the economic analysis of Professor Kaplow 
and Professor Cheng, and use an economic analysis to conclude burdens of 
proof need no great revision.132  Judge Richard Posner argues for reforms to 
burdens of proof to simultaneously maximize efficiency and protect 
noneconomic interests.133  
The underlying assumption of all of this work is that it is possible to 
define burdens of proof with some mathematical precision.  Perhaps so.  
But even if burdens of proof can – within academic literature -- be defined 
with mathematical precision, it is doubtful that it is within the capabilities of 
most judges and juries to apply them in that manner.134 
 3. Conclusions About Knowledge in Courts 
So then what do courts mean by “accuracy?”  “Accuracy” is an 
application of a confidence principle – it means that a quantum of evidence 
has been gathered sufficient to conclude that a probably correct 
determination of what happened can be reached.   
And this then gives us a better understanding of “knowledge” in 
courts.  “Knowledge” in courts is reaching a “correct enough” resolution, 
biasing toward certainty when the stakes involve liberty and staying near 
neutral when the stakes are private relationships.  
D. Understanding “Belief” in Courts 
 
We have defined “belief” in an information-gathering, decision-
making system as the point when the system has concluded that it has made 
                                                
129 Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Economic Perspective, 26 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 413 (1997). 
130 Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 YALE L. J. 738 (2012). 
131 Edward K. Cheng, Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof, 122 YALE L. J. 1254 (2013). 
132 Ronald J. Allen & Alex Stein, Evidence, Probability, and the Burden of Proof, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 557 
(2013). 
133 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1502-1507, 
1543 (1999). 
134 Because of constitutional concerns, the majority of all trials carry a right to trial by jury.  Without regard 
to one’s evaluation of the capabilities of the “average” judge, surely no one would argue that the “average” juror 
would or could satisfactorily apply a statistical/mathematical construct of burdens of proof. 
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not just any determination, but rather a determination that advanced the 
goals of the system. So to better understand “belief” in courts, we must 
understand why we have a publicly funded justice system.135  
1.  Substantive Fairness and Procedural Sufficiency 
Why do we have public courts? Why are we willing to devote 
enormous amounts of our public time and money to resolving who started a 
fight, or who caused an automobile accident?    
It might seem tautological that the goal of a justice system is – as the 
name of the system states – justice. An inscription on the walls of the 
Department of Justice states, “The United States wins its point whenever 
justice is done its citizens in the courts.”136  But in the context of law, the 
word “justice” is imprecise.  “Justice” can refer to either of at least two 
ideas -- substantive fairness and procedural sufficiency.  
Substantive fairness is an independently equitable result – one that 
meets a community sense of right and wrong.137  It is – like the weak 
deflationism understanding of truth – a singular matter (property) external 
to any particular dispute and which a trial either results has or not.138   
Procedural sufficiency is the fair opportunity to present one’s 
position to a neutral decision maker.139  It is what the United States 
                                                
135 Cf., Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 YALE L. J. 738 (2012) (Professor Kaplow applies a similar sort 
of  analytical approach – considering the “why” -- by proposing that how to set a burden of proof and evidence 
threshold should account for a variety of societal and system interests, including considering the cost of error in 
fact finding); see also H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 1-17 (2nd ed.) (Clarendon Press 1994) (the inquiry 
“What is law” should be answered by considering what concerns motivated the inquiry). 
136 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
137 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (REVISED EDITION) (Harvard Univ. Press 1971).  Rawlsian 
justice is, of course, but one formulation in a long philosophical dialogue – paralleling that of “what is truth?” – 
about “what is justice?”  For our purposes, it suffices to say that Rawls’s view is one seeking to define, and thus 
an example of, a construct of what is an objectively fair outcome.  The jurist Roscoe Pound saw this idea of 
justice – substantive fairness – as precisely what was the goal of the American courts.  See Roscoe Pound, Justice 
According to Law, THE MID-WEST QUARTERLY (1913-1918) 223, Paper 6 (1914).  Cf. Allen Buchanan & 
Deborah Mathieu, Philosophy and Justice, JUSTICE at 11 (Ronald L. Cohen, editor) (Plenum Press 1986) (“Justice 
is usually said to exist when a person receives that to which he or she is entitled….”) 
138  But see John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Justice, 66 CAL. L. REV. 541, 541-542 (1978) 
(arguing objective truth is best suited to scientific inquiries, while courts are better suited to distributive justice). 
139 A detailed discussion of the nature of procedural sufficiency as an articulation of justice can be found in 
the work of Professor Tom Tyler.  See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?  Criteria Used By 
Citizens To Assess The Fairness Of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOCY. REV. 103 (1988); Steven L. Blader & 
Tom R. Tyler, A Four-Component Model of Procedural Justice: Defining the Meaning of a “Fair” Process, 29 
PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 747 (2003); E. Allan Lind, Tom R. Tyler & Yuen J. Huo, Procedural Context and 
Culture: Variation in the Antecedents of Procedural Justice Judgments, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 767 
(1997).  Accord, Lita Furby, Psychology and Justice, JUSTICE at 163-164 and sources cited therein (Ronald L. 
Cohen, Editor) (Plenum Press 1986). (“…perceived fairness of procedures affects satisfaction with those 
procedures, independent of outcomes.”). 
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Supreme Court has held is procedurally guaranteed by the “Due Process” 
clauses of the Constitution.140   
Substantive fairness and procedural sufficiency – both broadly 
notions of “justice” that comfortably fit within a definition of the word – 
describe different ideas of justice.141   
While the nature of justice is an ongoing and intractable 
philosophical and jurisprudential debate, it is not a matter of doctrinal 
ambiguity in the American courts.   The architecture of the justice system 
reinforces at innumerable junctures that the goal is procedural sufficiency, 
by which we mean something akin to “fair enough.”142 Civil trials do not 
require unanimous verdicts.143  Criminal trials can have as few as six 
jurors.144  As we saw in our discussion of “justification in courts,” relevant 
evidence can be excluded for reasons of time consumption.145  Judges can 
put absolute time limits – literally using chess clocks -- on civil trials.146  If 
after the presentation of evidence at trial the fact finder is completely 
uncertain of which narrative is correct, rules of decision are imposed for 
that uncertainty to define a verdict, rather than extend the inquiry.147  
Standards of review can tie the hands of a judge to reverse a jury verdict 
that is contrary to scientific evidence.148  Appellate judges cannot overturn 
fact finding on the basis that the appellate judge believes the jury got it 
wrong.149  Professor Simon summarizes the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
as consistently affirming that “[d]efendants are [only] promised procedural 
                                                
140 See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-335 (1976). 
141 In August of 2014, one of the dominant news stories in the United States was the civil unrest in Ferguson, 
Missouri after a white police officer shot and killed an apparently unarmed African-American, Michael Brown, 
who witnesses claimed had his hands up at the moment of the shooting.  On CNN, the mother of Michael Brown 
was asked, “What is justice to you?”  She answered,  “Being fair.  Arresting this man and making him accountable 
for his actions.” CNN Newsroom with Carol Costello (August 18, 2014). That seems to be in a single answer an 
allusion to the two different concepts of judicial justice. 
142 Cf. Susan Haack, Epistemology Legalized: Or, Truth, Justice, and the American Way, 49 AM. J. JURIS. 
43, 50-51 (2004) (discussing how courts seek an answer that is “tolerably good.” 
143 See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410-411 (1972). 
144 See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 90-102 (1970). 
145 See FED. R. EVID. 403. 
146 See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 16(c)(2)(O). 
147 See generally, Ronald J. Allen & Alex Stein, Evidence, Probability, and the Burden of Proof, 55 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 557, 558-559 (2013). 
148 See Andrea Roth, Defying DNA: Rethinking the Role of the Jury in an Age of Scientific Proof of 
Innocence, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1643, 1679-1684 (2013); Robert J. Smith, Recalibrating Constitutional Innocence 
Protection, 87 WASH. L. REV. 139 (2012) (suggesting need to reconsider the trial as the center of gravity for 
innocence protection given the rapid escalation in the quality and quantity of scientific evidence which makes 
some forms of evidence more reliable with time). 
149 See, e.g., Stow v. Murashige, 389 F.3d 880, 890-891 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Allowing an appellate court to look 
behind a jury’s verdict conflicts with the rule that appellate courts should not scrutinize jury verdicts….  Even 
‘egregiously erroneous’ jury verdicts are entitled to double jeopardy effect …”); accord Holland v. United States, 
348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954) (once a jury is convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, there is no further role for 
the appellate courts in determining guilt). 
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rights, not reliable evidence or accurate verdicts.”150  The system repeatedly 
and intentionally is set simply to be “fair enough.”151 
This instinctively may seem wrong – or put another way, out of sync 
with intuitive notions of what is “justice” and what we as individuals in 
society want from our courts.  After all, if we asked almost anyone to 
envision himself or herself in court and to ask -- What if I were the criminal 
accused?  What if I were the crime victim?  What if someone had not 
honored a contract they had with me?  What if someone got hurt while in 
my house? – we generally expect the instinctive answer to be: “we want the 
court to do the right thing.”  
Some might assert the “real” answer is, “I want to win,”152 but even 
phrased this way the wish to win is not the craven answer it might at first 
appear to be.  We want to win because we want the courts “to be fair” – by 
which we mean “to reach the right answer.”  It is natural that usually we see 
the “fair” or “right” position as our own position.153  So under this 
construct, the “why” of American courts is substantive fairness.154   
But that answer fails under even nominal introspection. Seeking a 
correct answer cannot be the goal of the courts, because as discussed 
Section I supra, actually knowing what happened is not attainable.  And 
individually even our most craven selves quickly understand this when we 
think about it.  
What we want is the most justice we can afford.  There would be a 
price we found to be too much.  Other than a major criminal case, it would 
be the rare if ever trial where a party would take the position of “whatever I 
have is what I am willing to pay in order to win.”  So what we actually want 
                                                
150  DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 209 (Harvard Univ. 
Press 2012). 
151 Another aspect of systemic architecture supporting the same conclusion is the system-wide view on jury 
nullification, which usually is hidden from the jury’s ken.  See, e.g., Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury 
Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV. 253, 257 (1996) (“Current practice--with few exceptions--is not to instruct juries that 
they may nullify”). A system that pursues subjective fairness either allows the jury to determine the law, or 
empowers a jury to nullify the law.  A system that pursues procedural sufficiency either forbids or deeply 
discourages either approach.   
152 See generally, THANE ROSENBAUM, THE MYTH OF MORAL JUSTICE: WHY OUR LEGAL SYSTEM FAILS TO 
DO WHAT'S RIGHT 3-4 (HarperCollins 2004). 
153 See Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used By Citizens to Assess the Fairness of 
Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 103, 117 (1988) (“…as past studies have found, those receiving 
favorable outcomes think that those outcomes and the procedures used to arrive at them are fairer.”). 
154 Accord, Justin Sevier, The Truth-Justice Tradeoff: Perceptions of Decisional Accuracy and Procedural 
Justice in Adversarial and Inquisitorial Legal Systems, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 212, 214-216 (2014) (the 
United States adversarial system is better than the inquisitorial system at generating perceptions of fairness, while 
the inquisitorial system is better at generating perceptions of truth.). 
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is not “fair” but rather “fair enough.”155  And as soon as one moves from 
“fair” to “fair enough” one has moved to a notion of procedural sufficiency. 
The scholarly work of those who study “fairness” can help in 
understanding what “fair enough” looks like – in other words, what 
generically counts as procedural sufficiency.  The work can be summarized 
(perhaps crudely) as requiring a reasonable opportunity to tell one’s story to 
a neutral decision-maker.156   
To elaborate, procedural sufficiency requires first that all sides of a 
dispute perceive that they have the opportunity to prevail – it cannot be 
perceived as a rigged enterprise.  Any other conclusion would be 
antithetical to any definition of fairness.157 
This opportunity to prevail is a necessary but not sufficient aspect of 
any system that seeks to be fair enough.  After all, flipping a coin is “fair” 
in the sense of an opportunity to prevail, yet inadequate in achieving the 
goal that the parties had a non-rigged chance to win because they deserved 
to win.158  What is also necessary to get to this more fundamental sense of 
fairness is an opportunity to present one’s side of the merits – to tell one’s 
story -- coupled with a belief that the decision was intended in good faith to 
be merits-based.159  And of course a system that gives each side the 
                                                
155 See generally, Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 307, 308, 373-378 (1994) (“The regulation of lawyers in litigation … is appropriately viewed … as 
an aspect of procedural rules concerned with achieving accurate outcomes while not incurring excessive costs.”); 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (“[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally 
requires consideration of three distinct factors; First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probative value, 
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government‘s interest, including the 
function involved and the fiscal administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement 
would entail.”). 
156 See E. Allan Lind, Ruth Kanfer & P. Christopher Earley, Voice, Control, and Procedural Justice: 
Instrumental and Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 952, 957-
958 (1990); Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?  Criteria Used By Citizens To Assess The Fairness Of 
Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 103, 121-123, 128-131 (1988). 
157 See generally, Steven L. Blader & Tom R. Tyler, A Four-Component Model of Procedural Justice: 
Defining the Meaning of a “Fair” Process, 29 PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 747 (2003). 
158 Conversation with Scott Soames (October 10, 2014).  
159 See Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?  Criteria Used By Citizens To Assess The Fairness Of 
Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 103, 125-131 (1988).  See also, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 
333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)) (“The fundamental requirement of due 
process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’”). The Court has 
applied the Mathews framework to a wide variety of due process challenges.  See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 554 
U.S. 209, 224-28 (2005) (considering what due process protections Ohio must afford inmates before assigning 
them to a maximum-security prison with highly restrictive conditions); City of Los Angeles v. David 538 U.S. 
715, 716–19 (2003) (holding city may tow illegally parked automobile without a “prompt hearing”); FDIC v. 
Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 242-46 (1988) (upholding statute authorizing the FDIC to suspend an indicted bank official 
without a hearing); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1978) (holding public utility 
termination of services for nonpayment without affording customers an opportunity to dispute bills deprived 
customers of due process). 
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opportunity to tell their story -- and leaves each side with the belief that 
they were heard and that the decision maker at least tried to do the right 
thing -- a priori meets the first requirement of one where each side 
perceives it has had the opportunity to prevail.    
A dispute resolution system that has these aspects – what we might 
call a fair shot in a non-rigged game160 – is one which seeks an acceptable 
approximation of a fair result, and so can be said to be “fair enough,” or 
procedurally sufficient, from the perspective of a participant in a trial.161  
That would seem to be what a litigant will accept as “enough” when seeking 
“fairness.” 
2. Individual Fairness and Collective Fairness 
But now perhaps we need to briefly check ourselves.  Because a 
further challenge is that “fair enough” may look and feel very different 
when we are talking about my trial as opposed to talking about your trial.  
Consider the question: “How much of my money am I willing to invest to 
be confident the court got to the right answer in my case?” Now consider 
the question: “How much of my money am I willing to pay (in taxes, 
typically) to be confident the court got to the right answer in your case?”  
One would expect that the answer to these two questions differs.162  
Put another way, it is the nature of public courts that such courts are 
-- by definition -- forums where the money of many (our money) funds a 
court used by a few (your dispute).  So can we have confidence that a fair 
shot in a non-rigged game is in harmony with a societal norm of “fair 
enough” across the cultural heterogeneity of the United States?163  Or put 
                                                
160 In this context, “game” is not a diminutive term.  Rather, “Game theory concerns the behaviour [sic] of 
decision makers whose decisions affect each other. Its analysis is from a rational rather than a psychological or 
sociological viewpoint. It is indeed a sort of umbrella theory for the rational side of social science, where ‘social’ 
is interpreted broadly, to include human as well as non-human players (computers, animals, plants). Its 
methodologies apply in principle to all interactive situations, especially in economics, political science, 
evolutionary biology, and computer science.”  R.J. Aumann, Game Theory, THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS (2ND ED.) (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds.) (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 
http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_G000007> doi:10.1057/9780230226203.0615. 
161 See Leslie Ellis & Shari Siedman Diamond, Race, Diversity, and Jury Composition: Battering and 
Bolstering Legitimacy, 78 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 1033, 1040-1041 (2003). 
162 See generally, Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. 
LEGAL  STUD. 307, 328-330, 382-398, 399 (1994) (accuracy is very expensive and inefficient; there are differences 
between an individual’s interests and societal interests). 
163 Professor Tom Tyler – Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology at Yale University -- interviewed 
652 Chicagoans who had experience with the police, and found, “Seven aspects of procedural justice make an 
independent contribution to assessments of process fairness: the effort of the authorities to be fair; their honesty; 
whether their behavior is consistent with ethical standards; whether opportunities for representation are given; the 
quality of the decisions made; whether opportunities to appeal decisions exist; and whether the behavior of the 
authorities shows bias.”  Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?  Criteria Used By Citizens To Assess The 
Fairness Of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 103, 121 (1988).  It is difficult to use these factors more 
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yet another way, what is the precise role of publicly-funded justice in 
American communal life? 
The court system seeks sufficient closure to insure societal stability 
– peace in the streets.164  Simply put, societies without just courts are more 
likely to be unstable and violent.  One need look no further than the public 
responses to the verdict of acquittal in the O.J. Simpson multiple homicide 
trial, or the grand jury decision of whether to indict the police officers who 
shot Michael Brown or choked to death Eric Garner, to understand the 
potency of the slogan, “No Justice, No Peace.”165   
Communities that do not believe the justice system provides just 
resolution of righteous grievances take to the streets.  This will be discussed 
infra in detail – it is the heart of what we mean when we say an institution 
such as the justice system is “legitimate.”  But for the current juncture of 
this Article, it suffices simply to recognize that the relevant perspective of 
whether the courts are just is not only that of the litigant, but also – and 
perhaps primarily -- that of the broader community in which the courts 
reside.  So we then must ask, what aspects of the courts support a 
community belief that the courts are “just?” 
3. Perceptions of Justice and Actual Justice 
Asking about community perspective exposes another nuance of the 
explication of “justice” -- that “belief” by the community in the courts is a 
metalevel166 belief: belief that the courts are doing their jobs sufficiently.  
Two examples – one large and one small – help illustrate this point. 
First consider South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission.167  The theoretical predicate for the TRC was that for “[a] 
                                                                                                                       
specifically, as the factors in detail appear to be fluid from one culture to another.  See Rebecca A. Anderson & 
Amy L. Otto, Perceptions of Fairness in the Justice System: A Cross-Cultural Comparison, 31 SOC. BEHAV. & 
PERSONALITY 557, 562-63 (2003). 
164  See generally, Tom R. Tyler & Heather J. Smith, Social Justice and Social Movements, INSTITUTE OF 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS WORKING PAPER NO. 61 at 1 (1995) (“People’s actual behavior is … strongly linked to 
views about justice and injustice.  A wide variety of studies link justice judgments to positive behaviors ….  
…Conversely, other studies link the lack of justice to sabotage, theft, and on a collective level, to the willingness 
to rebel or protest.”).  
165 See PBS Frontline, O.J. Simpson Verdict Ten Years Later, www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/oj/view; 
New York Times, Latest Updates: Protests Nationwide as More Troops Are Called to Ferguson, 
news.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/live-updates-grand-jury-decision-ferguson; New York Times, Reaction to 
Eric Garner Grand Jury Decision, cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/live-updates-eric-garner-the-grand-jury-
decision. 
166 “A level or degree (of understanding, existence, etc.) which is higher and often more abstract than those 
levels at which a subject, etc., is normally understood or treated; a level which is above, beyond, or outside other 
levels, or which is inclusive of a series of lower levels.”  “Metalevel,” OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2015). 
167 See generally Justice Albie Sachs, South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 34 CONN. L. 
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country transitioning from authoritarian rule to democracy … . conventional 
institutions such as courts … are not viewed as being neutral enough ….”168  
The TRC “set an international standard,” successfully bringing stability in 
an environment where that was a more important societal need than 
criminal punishment.169  The lesson of the TRC is that the greatest value of 
expending public resources on determining what happened is not to achieve 
some morally acceptable outcome – appropriate retribution in a criminal 
matter or allocation of responsibility in a civil matter – but rather is to 
increase the likelihood of communal tranquility.170 
Now consider the story of a cab driver in Washington D.C. whom I 
encountered as I was writing this Article.171  The driver – an immigrant 
from Eritrea – discussed with me his experience with the local courts when 
he challenged traffic tickets.  He was frustrated that the courts promised him 
a presumption of innocence, but then informed him that he would have to 
pay the tickets unless he could produce proof that he had not committed a 
violation.  He explained (complained) that the system did not give him a 
presumption of innocence, but rather gave a pass to the City in proving his 
guilt when what was at issue was only a $50 ticket.  He said $50 was a lot 
of money to him, and so I asked if he appealed.  He said he did not because 
it was too much time and paperwork to fight a $50 ticket – it cost him more 
than $50 in lost time in his cab, and the fine doubled if he lost the appeal.  
From these two examples we can see that individual and community 
meanings of “justice” may differ in specific trials, but broadly are the same.  
South Africa realized that the importance of a process sacrificing “fair” 
individual retribution to the “greater good” of gaining closure through a 
                                                                                                                       
REV. 1037 (2002); Albert L. Sachs, Honoring the Truth in Post-Apartheid South Africa, 26 N.C. J. INT’L L. & 
COM. REG. 799 (2001). 
168 Daryl Balia, Truth and Reconciliation Commission 295, 296, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY, FIRST UPDATE SUPPLEMENT (Jack Rabin, editor) (Taylor & Francis 
2005); accord Paul Van Zyl, Dilemnas of Transitional Justice: The Case of South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, 52 J. INT’L AFFAIRS 647 (1999). 
169 Daryl Balia, Truth and Reconciliation Commission 295, 297, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY, FIRST UPDATE SUPPLEMENT (Jack Rabin, editor) (Taylor & Francis 
2005).  South Africa raises reconciliation to such a high value that on January 30, 2015 the government granted 
parole to Eugene De Kock, described as “Prime Evil” for his role as an apartheid era assassin, “in the interests of 
nation building and reconciliation.”  Peter Church, Apartheid’s Prime Evil, Eugene De Kock, to go free, SA 
Promo Magazine (January 30, 2015), https://www.sapromo.com/apartheids-prime-evil-eugene-de-kock-to-go-
free/7258. 
170  Trials as a search for truth and trials as a mechanism for tranquility are the two predominant explanations 
of the role of courts, but Mark Cammack offers a third explanation – trials as an attempt to “say something,” by 
which he means “…trials depict and thereby validate assumptions about the nature of fact and the authority of law 
on which the legitimacy of the practice depends.  The process, in effect, proves its own premises”  Mark 
Cammack, Evidence Rules and the Ritual Functions of Trials: “Saying Something of Something”, 25 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 783, 783-784, 789 (1992).  A fourth interpretation is offered by Charles Nesson, who explains how trials can 
be understood as a statement to the community about how certain behavior will be judged.   See Charles Nesson, 
The Evidence or the Event?  On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357 (1985).  
171  Interview of Yonas Teseay (January 5, 2015). 
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collective, societal airing of what had happened.  The cab driver – arguably 
for good reason – does not believe his trials were even a fair process, much 
less a fair outcome.  But his trials were fair enough that he was not 
motivated to social unrest, and to the broader community he had enough of 
a “fair shake.” In order to insure domestic tranquility and stability we must 
have a system that, if not always then at least almost always will give a fair 
enough process that the loser, however grudgingly, will accept the result.  
This formulation of “justice” – a concept that is to some significant 
but un-measureable degree rooted in public perception and public 
confidence – is explicitly and repeatedly recognized by the United States 
Supreme Court.  Thus, for example, in Taylor v. Louisiana, the Court wrote 
that “[c]ommunity participation in the administration of the criminal law … 
is … critical to public confidence in the criminal justice system.”172  In his 
dissent in Bush v. Gore, Justice Stevens famously wrote that the Opinion 
undermined the “public treasure” of “the public’s confidence in the Court 
itself” and thus “was a wound that may harm … the Nation.”173  In Press-
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, the Court wrote,  
 
The open trial thus plays as important a role in the 
administration of justice today as it did for centuries before 
our separation from England. The value of openness lies in 
the fact that people not actually attending trials can have 
confidence that standards of fairness are being observed; the 
sure knowledge that anyone is free to attend gives assurance 
that established procedures are being followed and that 
deviations will become known. Openness thus enhances both 
the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of 
fairness so essential to public confidence in the system.174 
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, Justice 
O’Connor wrote: 
The root of American governmental power is revealed most 
clearly in the instance of the power conferred by the 
Constitution upon the Judiciary of the United States and 
specifically upon this Court. As Americans of each 
                                                
172  419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).  See also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986) (prohibiting race-based 
peremptory strikes of jurors will strengthen “public respect for our criminal justice system”); U.S. v. Nixon, 418 
U.S. 683, 709 (1974) (“The very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on 
full disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence.”) 
173  531 U.S. 98, 157-58 (2000). 
174  464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984). 
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succeeding generation are rightly told, the Court cannot buy 
support for its decisions by spending money and, except to a 
minor degree, it cannot independently coerce obedience to its 
decrees. The Court's power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a 
product of substance and perception that shows itself in the 
people's acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what 
the Nation's law means and to declare what it demands.175 
Similar conclusions are reached by scholars.176  For example, Leslie 
Ellis and Shari Siedman Diamond -- summarizing the work of several social 
scientists -- wrote,  
[T]he level of satisfaction people feel with the decision of a 
trier of fact is strongly influenced by their perceptions of 
fairness of the procedures used by the trier to reach that 
decision.  That is, even when actual outcomes were held 
constant and even when those outcomes were negative, the 
perceived fairness of the procedures strongly influenced the 
party's satisfaction with the verdict and willingness to accept 
the legitimacy of the decision. These and more recent 
studies of procedural justice show that people are more 
willing to accept decisions and to adhere to agreements over 
time when they perceive those decisions as having been 
produced by fair procedures. Moreover, the authority and 
perceived legitimacy of the institutions that produce the 
decisions are enhanced when the procedures used to produce 
the decisions are viewed as fair, even when those decisions 
involved unfavorable outcomes. The comfort and positive 
reactions of litigants are of course important in and of 
themselves. But building perceptions of procedural justice 
has an additional important payoff: enhanced authority and 
legitimacy increase the likelihood that the parties will accept 
the jury's finding. The more legitimate the process is 
perceived to be, the more likely participants are to accept the 
outcome, positive or negative.177 
Professor James Gibson has done extensive contemporary work 
studying the prevalence of, reasons for, and stability of acceptance of the 
                                                
175  505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992). 
176  See, e.g., Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event?  On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of 
Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1367-1368 (1985). 
177 Leslie Ellis & Shari Siedman Diamond, Race, Diversity, and Jury Composition: Battering and Bolstering 
Legitimacy, 78 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 1033, 1039-1040 (2003).  
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legitimacy of a court decision or other governmental action without regard 
to whether one agrees or disagrees with it.178  That work can be summarized 
as concluding that public confidence not only is critical to the system, but 
that public confidence in the courts verifiably exists and is robust. 
4. Conclusions About “Belief” in Courts  
So what insights can we draw from this discussion of the meaning of 
“justice” in the American courts, and in turn better understand “belief” in 
courts?  “Justice” in the American courts is a procedural notion more than a 
substantive notion – the idea is to have courts that are “fair enough.”  
Justice is based on procedural access to courts and neutrality of decisions.  
Justice may depend as much upon perception as reality. And while the 
community at large may have a different notion of “fair enough” than the 
notions of individual participants in a trial, the two ideas are closely related.  
Because a system that is not usually perceived as fair enough can lead to 
mass unrest, the avoidance of which is a material (arguably predominating) 
goal of the system.   
What is “belief” in courts?  It means the courts have procedures for 
dispute resolution that society generally perceives and accepts as a fair 
opportunity – or perhaps a fair enough opportunity -- to present one’s 
position to a neutral decision-maker. 
E. Understanding “Truth” in Courts 
Let us now return to our original formulation of “knowledge 
requires truth, justification, and belief.”  In the context of “truth” in courts, 
we can now restate this formulation as: 
Reaching a “correct enough” resolution, biasing 
toward certainty when the stakes involve liberty and 
staying near neutral when the stakes are private 
relationships,  
                                                
178 See, e.g., James L. Gibson, Challenges to the Impartiality of State Supreme Courts: Legitimacy Theory 
and “New-Style” Judicial Campaigns, 102 AM. POLITICAL SCIENCE REV. 59 (2008); James L. Gibson, Gregory 
A. Caldeira, & Vanessa A. Baird, On the Legitimacy of National High Courts, 92 AM. POLITICAL SCIENCE REV. 
343 (1998); James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira, & Lester Kenyatta Spence, Why Do People Accept Public 
Policies They Oppose?  Testing Legitimacy Theory with a Survey-Based Experiment, 58 POLITICAL RESEARCH Q. 
187 (2005); James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira, & Lester Kenyatta Spence, Measuring Attitudes toward the 
United States Supreme Court, 47 AM. J. POLITICAL SCIENCE 354 (2003); James L. Gibson, On Legitimacy Theory 
and the Effectiveness of Truth Commissions, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 123 (2009); James L. Gibson & 
Michael J Nelson, The Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court: Conventional Wisdoms, and Recent Challenges 
Thereto, 10 ANNUAL REV. OF LAW & SOC. SCIENCE (2014). 
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REQUIRES 
Relevant facts both within the evaluative skills of 
jurors’ competence and that do not promote defined 
undesirable behaviors external to the trial;  
Procedures for dispute resolution that society 
generally perceives and accepts as a fair opportunity – 
or perhaps a fair enough opportunity -- to present 
one’s position to a neutral decision-maker; and, 
“Truth.” 
From this we can isolate and formulate an understanding of “truth” in 
courts.  “Truth” in courts is a sufficient – albeit intentionally incomplete -- 
correspondence of judgments of what happened to what actually happened.  
Put somewhat differently, “truth” in courts refers to the relative role a 
colloquial meaning of “accuracy” has in the family of other values courts 
seek to advance; meaning there has been adequate procedural process to 
support a general communal sense of systemic fairness without regard to the 
outcome in a particular case..  This is because courts unquestionably 
compromise the likelihood of achieving colloquial accuracy in order to 
serve other concerns. 
As we saw in our exploration of justification, this balancing of 
colloquial accuracy against other values sometimes emerges quite 
dramatically.  In response to the pattern of societally unacceptable treatment 
of rape victims in the courts, evidence codes were revised to provide rape 
shield laws.179  These laws exclude evidence unquestionably relevant to the 
defense, for reasons external to achieving a correct trial verdict.180 
In response to police misconduct, the Supreme Court has ruled to 
exclude evidence gathered without Miranda warnings.181  This is a 
controversial rule precisely because it keeps relevant evidence out.182 
                                                
179 See generally J. Alexander Tanford & Anthony J. Bocchino, Rape Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 
128 U. PA. L. REV. 544 (1980); Frank Tuerkheimer, A Reassessment and Redefinition of Rape Shield Laws, 50 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1245 (1989). 
180  Id. 
181  See generally Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, 8 
AM. BAR FNDTN. RESEAERCH J.  585 (1983); Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (And Still Need 
to Learn) About the “Costs” of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of “Lost” Arrests, 8 AM. 
BAR FNDTN. RESEAERCH J. 611 (1983). 
182  Id.  See also Jenia Iontcheva Turner, The Exclusionary Rule As a Symbol of the Rule of Law, 67 SMU L. 
REV. 821, 829 (2014) 
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In espionage and terrorism cases obtaining a verdict is compromised 
by the security classification keeping some facts out of evidence.183  
National security trumps accuracy.184 
While this Article has separately explored “justification” in courts, 
“belief” in courts, and “knowledge” in courts, in many instances these 
phrases have overlapping themes that now emerge in “truth” in courts.  So 
while the Federal Rules of Evidence essentially define “justification” in 
courts, we see that in doing so some rules serve as animating the related 
concept of “truth” in courts.  Thus, Rule 403 explicitly states, “The court 
may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: … undue delay, 
wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”185  In others 
words, colloquial accuracy can be subservient to some degree to concerns 
of time and efficiency. 
We similarly see overlaps between “truth” in courts in our 
exploration of “knowledge” in courts. The explication of knowledge in 
courts relied heavily on burdens of proof as decisional rules.  Burdens also 
function as evidence regulation rules – who presents evidence first and how 
much they must present.  In this way, burdens of proof also are integral to 
seeing examples of and thus understanding “truth” in courts. Presumptions 
of discriminatory intent in employment actions shift the burden to the 
defendant to present evidence of nondiscriminatory intent,186 and the res 
ipsa loquitur doctrine shifts the burden to the defendant to disprove 
negligence in settings of highly suspicious accidents.187  Both are instances 
of setting balance points between accuracy and finality in evidence 
regulation, and thus to what is meant by truth in courts. 
And then there are the “truth” in courts threads in our exploration of 
“belief” in courts.  Is there too much frivolous litigation, or too many 
runaway juries, or both, or neither?  Are there too few paths to recovery, or 
too strict evidentiary rules, or too little supervision of police practices?  
Concerns about these and other, similar “belief” questions spawn calls for 
reform in recurring patterns.188  
                                                
183  See, e.g., Robert Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1249, 1263-1266 (2007). 
184  Id. 
185  FED. R. EVID. 403. 
186  See R. Alexander Acosta & Eric J. Von Vorys, Bursting Bubbles and Burdens of Proof: Disagreements 
on the Summary Judgment Standard in Disparate Treatment Employment Discrimination Cases, 2 TEX. REV. L. & 
POLITICS 207, 210-214 (1997-1998). 
187   See William L. Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitor in California, 37 CAL. L. REV.183 (1949). 
188 See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Frivolous Litigation and Civil Justice Reform: Miscasting the Problem, 
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The meaning of “truth” in courts perhaps is best illustrated by two 
United States Supreme Court Opinions – one civil and one criminal – each 
an unambiguous elevation of external concerns over colloquial accuracy.  In 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal189 the Supreme Court considered the case of Javid Iqbal, a 
Muslim Pakistani who had overstayed his student visa and gotten caught up 
in the post-9/11 security sweeps – Iqbal asserted that both the decision to 
detain him and the conditions of his confinement were based on his religion 
and/or national origin.190  But his allegations became enmeshed in an earlier 
narrative about frivolous litigation, and so the Court held, in order to reduce 
the frequency of frivolous litigation, that a trial judge could dismiss Iqbal’s 
complaint at the pleading stage.191  Simply put, the Court held that reducing 
the incidence of frivolous litigation was worth the price of some erroneous 
dismissals of meritorious cases.192 
The Court even more dramatically rejected the primacy of colloquial 
accuracy in Herrera v. Collins.193 Herrera was convicted of murder and 
sentenced to death.  He filed a habeas petition, supported by affidavits 
showing his actual innocence.194 The Court’s Opinion framed the issue not 
as whether the State could execute an innocent man, but as whether a man 
who had been convicted of murder in accordance with due process is 
entitled to habeas relief based on new exculpatory evidence.195  The Court 
held that he was not: “Petitioner is not innocent, in any sense of the word.  
…  He was tried before a jury of his peers, with the full panoply of 
protections that our Constitution affords criminal defendants.  At the 
conclusion of that trial, the jury found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”  (Italics added.)196   
                                                                                                                       
Recasting the Solution, 54 DUKE L. J. 447 (2004); Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the 
“Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day In Court and Jury Trial 
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982 (2003).. 
189  556 U.S. 662 (2008). 
190  See 556 U.S. at 667-670.   
191  Kenneth S. Klein, Removing the Blindfold and Tipping the Scales: The Unintended Lesson of Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal Is That Frivolous Lawsuits May Be Important to Our Nation, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 593, 593-594, 599-605 
(2010). 
192  Id. 
193  506 U.S. 390 (1993). 
194  Id. at 393.  
195  Id. at 399–400 
196  Id. at 419.  Justice Blackmun dissented, framing the issue as “whether the Constitution forbids the 
execution of a person who has been validly convicted and sentenced but who, nonetheless, can prove his 
innocence with newly discovered evidence.”  Id. at 430.  Herrera’s last words before he was executed four months 
later were, “I am innocent . . . . something very wrong is taking place tonight. . . .”  Offender Information, Texas 
Dep’t of Criminal Justice, http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/death_row/dr_info/hererraleonellast.html (last accessed 11-
18-14).  Accord, In re Davis, 557 U.S. 952, 130 S.Ct.1, 3 (“This Court has never held that the Constitution forbids 
the execution of a convicted defendant who has had a full and fair trial but is later able to convince a habeas court 
that he is “actually” innocent. Quite to the contrary, we have repeatedly left that question unresolved, while 
expressing considerable doubt that any claim based on alleged “actual innocence” is constitutionally cognizable.”) 
(italics in original; citations omitted) (Scalia dissenting) (2009). 
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“Truth” in courts is “accuracy-enough” as balanced against other 
system values, such as the likelihood of truly new and controlling evidence, 
the reasons the evidence is so late forthcoming, and the adequacy and 
exhaustiveness of the process already afforded.  None of these would 
suffice to reject consideration of new evidence if colloquial accuracy was 
what was meant by “truth in courts.”197 
So by “truth” in courts we mean the balancing point the justice 
system draws as the boundary between the complete accuracy, on the one 
hand, and competing societal values both internal and external the courts, 
on the other hand, to have a sufficient correspondence of judgments of what 
happened to what actually happened.   
II.  “LEGITIMACY,” OR WHY THE MEANING OF “TRUTH” IN 
COURTS MIGHT MATTER 
While it is intellectually interesting to explore the meaning of truth 
in courts, the exploration leaves open the inquiry of whether the answer 
matters in any meaningful way. It does, and the starting point of 
understanding that importance is to recognize a key conclusion from the 
explication of truth in courts.  “Truth” in courts is (“accuracy enough”) is 
different from what the general public would suppose courts do – seeking 
actual accuracy.  The reason that the meaning of truth in courts matters is 
because this dissonance can undermine the legitimacy of the courts as a 
social institution.   
In David Easton’s third work in his project on empirically-oriented 
political theory, Easton describes “the inculcation of a sense of legitimacy” 
as “probably the most effective device for regulating the flow of diffuse 
support in favor both of the authorities and of the regime.”198  Easton posits 
the question whether a political system could “survive without” “feelings of 
legitimacy,” and answers that “such convictions” are “helpful and perhaps 
even necessary.”199  “If the constant threat of living on a precipice of 
disorder is to be avoided, at a minimum the authorities require some 
assurance … they can expect regularly to obtain compliance …. The belief 
in the legitimacy of the authorities and regimes provides such a stable 
                                                
197 When Dan Simon and Laurie Levinson write about accuracy concerns – they advocate for changing the 
priority of accuracy in the system, not for making it the only value on the list.  See DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS (Harvard Univ. Press 2012); Laurie L. Levinson, Searching for 
Injustice: The Challenge of Post-Conviction Discovery, Investigation, and Litigation, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 545 
(2015). 
198 DAVID EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE 278 (John Wiley & Sons 1965). 
199 Id. at 278-79. 
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connection.”200  “Regardless of what the members may feel about the 
wisdom of the action of authorities, obedience may flow from some 
rudimentary convictions” that “the authorities … are legitimate.”201  
Easton’s work introduced the concept of “Legitimacy Theory,” 
which Easton defined as that which “gives explicit consideration to the 
expectations of society…, and whether an organization appears to be 
complying with the expectations of the societies within which it 
operates.”202 Institutions with diffuse (as opposed to specific) support are 
said to be legitimate, meaning the institution enjoys support even when 
society disagrees with the institution’s specific acts.203   
As Easton’s definition highlights, it is potentially problematic when 
an institution is not acting within societal expectations of an institution.  
And so it bears understanding how legitimacy theory applies to the justice 
system and whether it predicts a concern from a dissonance between 
societal understandings of what courts do and what courts actually do. 
A. Legitimacy of the Justice System 
 “Legitimacy” of legal institutions is a concept familiar to 
international law.204  For our purposes, we are exploring “judicial” 
legitimacy in a domestic context – the question of what gives courts 
legitimacy and what role “truth” plays in that legitimacy.  That is a notion 
that has received far less attention. 
1. Legitimacy of the Supreme Court of the United 
States 
Almost all of the scholarly work applying Legitimacy Theory to the 
justice system does so with focus on decisions of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, and concluding the Court has a deep reservoir of 
legitimacy.205 Despite Justice Stevens’s poignantly expressed concerns in 
                                                
200 Id. at 279. 
201 Id. at 279-80. 
202 Id. at 279-80. 
203 Craig Deegan, Legitimacy Theory, METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN ACCOUNTING RESEARCH: THEORIES, 
METHODS AND ISSUES 161 (Zahirui Hoque, ed.) (Spiramus Press 2006).  See also, DAVID EASTON, A SYSTEMS 
ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE 273 (John Wiley & Sons 1965). 
204 See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (Oxford Univ. Press 
1990) (explaining why international law has compliance pull). 
205 See Damon Cann & Jeff Yates, Homegrown Institutional Legitimacy: Assessing Citizens’ Diffuse Support 
for Their State Courts, 36 AM. POLITICS RESEARCH 297, 297-300 (2008) (“A wealth of scholarship exists on the 
topic of public support of and views toward the United States Supreme Court.”). 
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his dissent in Bush v. Gore,206 “in the long run, public perceptions of the 
Court’s legitimacy were not adversely affected” by that decision, nor any 
decision -- “public support for the Supreme Court does not appear to turn on 
citizens’ ideological agreement with its specific policy decisions.”207  The 
Court enjoys broad legitimacy. 
2. Legitimacy of the Trial Courts 
“Despite the policy import of state courts, only a small number of 
studies have examined citizen support for state courts …, and nearly all of 
these have analyzed only a single city or state’s citizens’ views towards its 
courts.”208  For this reason, in 2008 Professors Damon Cann and Jeff Yates 
identified and applied to state trial judges the metrics on which trial court 
legitimacy – diffuse support allowing an institution to persist and retain its 
authority without regard to agreement with specific decisions – rests.209 
They identified four -- belief that judges are trustworthy and honest; belief 
that judges are fair; belief that courts provide equal justice; and belief that 
decisions are based on fact and law.210 
Cann and Yates confined their focus to judges.  But the institutional 
insiders positioned to influence the honesty, fairness, neutrality, and 
justification of trial court decisions are not just judges, but also lawyers and 
juries.  So to understand the nature -- and the fragility or resilience – of the 
legitimacy of the trial courts, we need to look at all three. 
a. Judges and Legitimacy 
To the extent that empirical work on the legitimacy of trial courts 
has been done, it has looked at legitimacy and judges.  There is reason to 
                                                
206 See fn. 173 & accompanying text, supra. 
207 Damon Cann & Jeff Yates, Homegrown Institutional Legitimacy: Assessing Citizens’ Diffuse Support for 
Their State Courts, 36 AM. POLITICS RESEARCH 297, 297. See also, James L. Gibson, Milton Lodge, & Benjamin 
Woodson, Losing, But Accepting: Legitimacy, Positivity Theory, and the Symbols of Judicial Authority, 48 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 837, 837-838 (2014), citing Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and 
Legitimation, 57 ANNUAL REV. OF PSYCHOLOGY 375 (2006); James L. & Michael J Nelson, The Legitimacy of the 
U.S. Supreme Court: Conventional Wisdoms, and Recent Challenges Thereto, 10 ANNUAL REV. OF LAW & SOC. 
SCIENCE (2014), and James L. Gibson, Legitimacy is for Losers: The Role of Institutional Legitimacy and the 
Symbols of Judicial Authority in Inducing Acquiescence to Disagreeable Court Rulings, Presented at the 62nd 
Nebraska Symposium on Motivation  -- Motivating Cooperation and Compliance with Authority: The Role(s) of 
Institutional Trust and Confidence. (Keynote Speaker). April 24--25, 2014. 
208 Damon Cann & Jeff Yates, Homegrown Institutional Legitimacy: Assessing Citizens’ Diffuse Support for 
Their State Courts, 36 AM. POLITICS RESEARCH 297, 300 (2008) (citations omitted).  For our purposes, we can 
equate Cann’s and Yates’s study of “state courts” to our focus on “American courts” or “trial courts.”   
209 See Damon Cann & Jeff Yates, Homegrown Institutional Legitimacy: Assessing Citizens’ Diffuse Support 
for Their State Courts, 36 AM. POLITICS RESEARCH 297, 303-305 (2008). 
210 See Damon Cann & Jeff Yates, Homegrown Institutional Legitimacy: Assessing Citizens’ Diffuse Support 
for Their State Courts, 36 AM. POLITICS RESEARCH 297, 303-305 (2008). 
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have done so.  One 2013 poll found 87% of voters said they believed that in 
states where judges were elected, direct campaign donations and 
independent spending either had “some” or “a great deal” of influence on 
judges’ decisions.211 Studying the state of Georgia, Damon Cann 
“empirically established” that attorney “campaign contributions influence 
judicial decisionmaking [sic]” in the attorney’s cases before that judge.212 
 
Partisan elections do undermine confidence in court legitimacy.  
“Citizens’ concerns over costly, intense, partisan judicial election 
campaigns are eroding society’s goodwill toward their state courts.”213  Yet 
while undermined to some degree, “state courts enjoy the diffuse support of 
citizens, and thus citizens believe in the legitimacy of their state courts even 
when they do not agree with their policy outputs.”214  When focusing on 
judges, Cann and Yates -- summarizing and extending the work of others -- 
found, “on balance, Americans generally hold favorable attitudes toward 
their state courts.”215  Concern about neutrality of judges does undermine 
but does not overcome a belief in trial court legitimacy. 
b. Lawyers and Legitimacy 
It is not hard to document the public disregard for lawyers.216  And it 
is not hard to isolate what underlies this disregard.  The public believes the 
behavior of lawyers distorts the ability of courts to discern the truth.217  
There is broad concern that the system advantages the litigant with 
lawyer best skilled at manipulating the rules.218  As Justice Scalia wrote in 
                                                
211  See http://www.justiceatstake.org/newsroom/press-releases-
16824/?new_poll_vast_majority_of_voters_fear_campaign_cash_skews_judges_decisions&show=news&newsID
=17594. 
212 Damon M. Cann, Justice for Sale? Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisonmaking, 3 STATE 
POLITICS & POLICY Q. 281, 292 (2007). 
213 Damon Cann & Jeff Yates, Homegrown Institutional Legitimacy: Assessing Citizens’ Diffuse Support for 
Their State Courts, 36 AM. POLITICS RESEARCH 297, 313 (2008). 
214 Id. at 316. 
215 Id. at 304-305. 
216  See, e.g., Michael Asimow, Bad Lawyers in the Movies, 24 NOVA L. REV. 533, 533-549 (1999-2000); E. 
Cliff Martin & T. Karena Dees, The Truth About Truthfulness: The Proposed Commentary to Rule 4.1 of the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 15 GEORGETOWN J. LEGAL ETHICS 777, 779-781 (2002); Bruce A. Green, 
“The Whole Truth?”: How Rules of Evidence Make Lawyers Deceitful, 25 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 699, 700-704 
(1992); Marc Galanter, Robert S. Marx Lecture: The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of Lawyers in Public Opinion, 
Jokes, and Political Discourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 805, 807-835 (1998); Leonard E. Gross, The Public Hates 
Lawyers: Why Should We Care, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 1405 1405-1420 (1999). 
217  See, e.g., Karena Dees, The Truth About Truthfulness: The Proposed Commentary to Rule 4.1 of the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 15 GEORGETOWN J. LEGAL ETHICS 777, 779-781 (2002); Bruce A. Green, 
“The Whole Truth?”: How Rules of Evidence Make Lawyers Deceitful, 25 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 699, 700-704 
(1992). 
218 See, e.g., Marvin E. Frankel, The Search For Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 PENN. L. REV. 1031, 1034, 
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dissent in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., “What above all else is 
eroding public confidence in the Nation's judicial system is the perception 
that litigation is just a game, that the party with the most resourceful lawyer 
can play it to win ….”219   
But in the context of legitimacy, Justice Scalia’s concern with 
“resourceful lawyers” could describe either of two circumstances, and the 
two circumstances are not of equal import to the legitimacy of the courts. 
“Resourceful lawyers” could be “cheaters” – players violating rules and 
thereby undermining an otherwise legitimate system architecture.  
Alternatively, “resourceful lawyers” could be lawyers who have seen that 
the rules of the system leave room to influence the likely outcome of trials – 
this would suggest some illegitimacy in the system architecture itself.  It 
seems to be the perception of the latter of these two descriptions that Ninth 
Circuit Justice Alec Kozinski lamented in a recent dissenting Opinion,  
When we take the judicial oath of office, we swear to 
“administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal 
right to the poor and to the rich ….”  28 U.S.C. § 453.  I 
understand this to mean that we must not merely be impartial, 
but must appear to be impartial to a disinterested observer.  
…  [Petitioner here would] have had a fairer shake in a 
tribunal run by marsupials. … How can a court committed to 
justice, as our court surely is, reach a result in which the 
litigant who can afford a lawyer is forgiven its multiple 
defaults while the poor, uneducated, un-counseled petitioner 
has his feet held to the fire?220 
So in the absence of research on the impacts of lawyer (mis)behavior on 
legitimacy – in other words, when the best we can do is formulate a 
reasonable, as yet untested hypothesis of the relationship of lawyers to 
legitimacy -- it is important to better understand what resourceful lawyers 
do and how the system responds to it. 
The justice system is defined by a set of rules that purport to be 
designed to promote certain outcomes.  In the justice system, we have 
defined the generic, target outcome as a fair shot in a non-rigged game.  If 
we are thinking of this target in more economics-laden language, then we 
                                                                                                                       
1035 (1975) (“It becomes evident the search for truth fails too much of the time.  The rules and devices 
accounting for the failures come to seem less agreeable and less clearly worthy than they once did.  The skills of 
the advocate seem less noble …. The advocate’s prime loyalty is to his client, not to truth as such.”). 
219 556 U.S. 868, 903 (2009). 
220 Alvarez v. Tracy, 773 F.3d 1011, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 2014) (Kozinski dissent). 
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might call this target a degree of probability – or acceptable approximation 
or likelihood – of objective substantive fairness (a correct result).  But 
paradoxically, the same rules designed to promote this approximately 
objective, substantive fairness, provide opportunities for participants in the 
system – typically anyone with disproportionate wealth -- to distort the 
likely outcome of the case.   
Put simply, as Justice Kozinski alluded, without regard to the merits, 
money seems to increases one’s chances of winning (and poverty makes it 
hard to win), even for a party staying within the rules. From the perspective 
of the system, the distortive power of a wealthy party is an actor playing 
within the letter but not the spirit of the rules.  The system designs rules to 
promote one sort of behavior.   The way the rules are written give 
opportunities to engage in an inapposite – and from the system perspective, 
counter-productive -- set of behavior.   
A colorful way of capturing the concept of a player using the rules 
of the game in a way that is counter-productive to the goals of the game is 
to call the player a “manipulator.”221   Because tactical manipulation 
arguably is both within and without the rules, it is paradoxical behavior.   
A concrete example of a paradoxical “manipulator” in action is a 
recurring settlement strategy in a civil case between parties who have vastly 
different wealth.  In order to promote the resolution of disputes without 
resort to the courts, all United States jurisdictions have a variant of the so-
called “American Rule” that each side bear their own attorney’s fees and 
costs without regard to who wins a case.222  Because of the American Rule, 
                                                
221  In the culture of some sports – golf is a prime example — the spirit of the rules is paramount and so a 
player is expected to self report a rules violation.  But the more usual approach in sports – for example, 
international soccer – is that the spirit of the game is not paramount, and so breaking the rules to gain advantage – 
if not caught – not only is acceptable but is expected.  As the saying goes in NASCAR, “If you ain’t cheating you 
ain’t tryin’.”  The discordant tension common in sports between the rules and spirit of play is part of trial practice.  
The legal profession long has struggled with the tension between zealous advocacy within the rules and promoting 
the ultimate ends of justice. See, e.g., Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for the Truth: An Umpireal View, 122 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1031 (1975); Monroe H. Freedman, Judge Frankel’s Search For Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1060 (1975); 
Jean M. Cary, Rambo Depositions: Controlling an Ethical Cancer in Civil Litigation, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 561 
(1996); see generally, Report of the Commission on Professionalism to the Board of Governors and the House of 
Delegates of the American Bar Association, ‘…In the Spirit of Public Service:’ A Blueprint For the Rekindling of 
Lawyer Professionalism, 112 F.R.D. 243 (1987).  Comment 1 to Rule 1.3 (Diligence) of the ABA Model Rules 
seems of two minds, noting both that a lawyer must “take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to 
vindicate a client’s cause” and that a “lawyer is not bound … to press for every advantage that might be realized 
for a client.”  Yet Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 empowers a court to punish and rectify lawyer behavior that 
while potentially advancing a client’s likelihood of success has no possible grounding in the substantive legal or 
factual merits of the case.  In light of the inconsistency of law on the question, I am comfortable  -- albeit 
intentionally provocative and arguably overly pejorative -- calling a wealthy tactician a “manipulator” for the 
purposes of this Article. 
222 See Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 252-53 (2010); see generally, John 
Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 9, 
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a well-heeled party can leverage their wealth to force a distorted result on a 
poorer party.223  Essentially, the threat of “I am willing to spend 
disproportionately to the stakes of the matter” – often expressed as “I will 
take this all the way to the Supreme Court!” or “I’ll paper you under” – is a 
bluff the poorer party can not afford to call.224  It is the threat by a party 
with wealth to act apparently economically irrationally, thus imposing an 
unbearable transaction cost on an opponent. If the opponent believes the 
threat, then the opponent should abandon the transaction or settle.225   
I characterize the behavior of the wealthy actor as “apparently 
economically irrational” because there are at least two ways to describe the 
behavior as rational.  One is the instance where the wealthy actor’s decision 
is irrational if contrasting the particular transaction costs with the size of the 
transaction, but rational when considered within a broader context.226  So, 
for example, the Mattel Toy Company – whose flagship product is the 
Barbie doll – might decide that in order to discourage all potential infringers 
of its protected intellectual property in Barbie, it is willing to spend 
disproportionately to shut down a single infringer.227  This is loosely 
conceptually related to the antitrust-prohibited behavior described as 
“tying,” which is using one’s larger economic footprint to obtain 
competitive advantage in a sub-market against niche competitors.228  
A second theory of rationality might be that the wealthy actor 
understands that its opponent cannot sustain the transaction costs, and so the 
bluff will never be called; in this instance the rational choice is to make the 
threat.229  This is loosely conceptually related to the antitrust-prohibited 
                                                                                                                       
27-36 (1984). 
223 Accord Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Models for 
the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 69-73 (1982) (adopting the English Rule rather than the 
American Rule may increase likelihood of settlement). 
224 The settlement strategy of a “litigate or capitulate” offer is an ultimatum in a bi-lateral negotiation 
involving asymmetrical information.  For an economic analysis of such strategies, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 
Litigation and settlement under imperfect information, 15 RAND J. ECON. 404, 404-15 (1984). 
225 This is a variant of the problem economist Richard Selten labeled, “the chain-store paradox.”  See 
Reinhard Selten, The Chain-Store Paradox, 9 THEORY AND DECISION 127, 127-159 (1978); see also generally, 
David M. Kreps & Robert Wilson, On the chain-store paradox and predation: Reputation for toughness, GSB 
Research Paper No. 551 (Stanford University Graduate School of Business, June 1980) 
http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/working-papers/chain-store-paradox-predation-reputation-
toughness; David M. Kreps & Robert Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect Information, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 253, 
254-55 (1982).   
226 See David M. Kreps & Robert Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect Information, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 253, 
256-66 (1982).   
227 In the opening line of the Opinion in Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc. 296 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 2002), 
Justice Kozinski refers to Mattel as “Trademark Kong.” 
228  See, e.g., Bhan v. NME Hospitals, Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1411 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Tying exists when a seller 
refuses to sell one product unless the buyer also purchases another. To prove an illegal tie, a party must show 1) a 
tying of two distinct products or services, 2) sufficient economic power in the tying product market to affect the 
tied market, and 3) an effect on a substantial amount of commerce in the tied market.”), cert. denied 502 U.S. 994.  
229 See David M. Kreps & Robert Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect Information, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 253, 
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behavior described as creating unlawful “barriers to entry,” one variant 
which is using economic power to create unacceptable transaction costs to 
potential competitors thereby dissuading the competitors from ever entering 
a market.230   
But for our purposes, whether the well-heeled actor is rational or 
irrational does not matter, because under either scenario, the other party 
should settle for an under-valued amount or otherwise abandon the 
litigation.231  In other words, a rational party acting apparently irrationally 
can force a rational opponent to accept an irrational outcome.232  Or as my 
wife puts it, “you can’t negotiate with a three-year old.”233 
This is but one concrete example of the manipulator’s paradox.  
Others abound.  To name a few, the liberal rules of civil discovery routinely 
offer the opportunity to impose huge litigation costs on an opponent.234  The 
multitude of possible pre-trial motions presents a similar opportunity,235 as 
does SLAPP litigation.236  
                                                                                                                       
256-66 (1982).   
230 See, e.g., International Air Industries, Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 724 (5th Cir. 1975) 
(“…the competitor is charging a price below its short-run, profit-maximizing price and barriers to entry are great 
enough to enable the discriminator to reap the benefits of predation before new entry is possible.”), cert. denied 
424 U.S. 943 (1976). 
231 Accord, Charles B. Renfrew, Discovery Sanctions: A Judicial Perspective, 67 CAL. L. REV. 264, 267 
(1979) (“… litigants taking advantage of superior financial resources to bury their opponents in an unending 
barrage of motions that make capitulation to unfair settlements the only sensible alternative to continued 
litigation.”).   
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game of incomplete information." See ROBERT GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMISTS 2-7, 173-253 
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Wilson, On the chain-store paradox and predation: Reputation for toughness at 1-2, GSB Research Paper No. 
551 (Stanford University Graduate School of Business, June 1980) http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-
research/working-papers/chain-store-paradox-predation-reputation-toughness. 
233 My spouse, Professor Lisa M. Black (too many times to count). 
234 See generally, Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635 (1989), quoted and cited 
with approval in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007); but see Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery 
in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences For Unfounded 
Rulemaking, 46 STANFORD L. REV. 1393 (1994). 
235 See, e.g., Report of the Commission on Professionalism to the Board of Governors and the House of 
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Lawyer Professionalism, 112 F.R.D. 243, 290 (1987) (“The filing of frivolous motions and complaints, asserting 
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Charles B. Renfrew, Discovery Sanctions: A Judicial Perspective, 67 CAL. L. REV. 264, 267 (1979) (“The 
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financial resources to bury their opponents in an unending barrage of motions that make capitulation to unfair 
settlements the only sensible alternative to continued litigation.”). 
236 See, e.g., Rusheen v. Cohen, 37 Cal. 4th 1048, 1055-56 (2006) (“A SLAPP suit—a strategic lawsuit 
against public participation—seeks to chill or punish a party's exercise of constitutional rights to free speech and 
to petition the government for redress of grievances.  …  The Legislature enacted Code of Civil Procedure section 
425.16—known as the anti-SLAPP statute—to provide a procedural remedy to dispose of lawsuits that are 
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And this is in no way unique to the civil dispute side of the aisle.  
The Supreme Court decisions of Brady237 and Kyles238 require a prosecutor 
to turn over all information favorable to a defendant. The articulation of the 
rule creates an opportunity for the prosecutor – within the rules – to “cheat.” 
As the Supreme Court recognized in Kyles, “…the prosecution … alone can 
know what is undisclosed….”239 Because the doctrine is not phrased as 
“turn over all information,” but rather is phrased in reference to evidence 
“material either to guilt or punishment,”240 the prosecutor has an incentive 
to characterize information as neutral, and thus never turn it over – a 
decision that will be known only to the prosecutor.241 
So lawyers may act within the rules in a way that distorts accuracy.  
But before turning to the system response to these manipulations, there is 
one other observation that bears mention.  In their work focusing on judges, 
Cann and Yates found legitimacy conclusions persisted even though -- 
among other factors -- there was a deep perception that justice favored 
wealthy and powerful individuals.242  If the perception that judges favor the 
wealthy and powerful does not undermine legitimacy, then perhaps the 
perception that the wealthy and powerful can hire a lawyer more skilled at 
manipulating the rules also does not undermine legitimacy; indeed, these 
may be the same perception (that the wealthy and powerful hire skilled 
lawyers who influence judges to dispense unequal justice). 
Nonetheless, we can see in court rules a slow, but nonetheless 
steady, system response: while the justice system is rife with examples of 
the manipulator’s paradox, many examples can be matched with a system 
attempt to eliminate or ameliorate the “bad” conduct.  
                                                                                                                       
brought to chill the valid exercise of constitutional rights.”); accord, Cal. Code Civ. P. §425.16(a) (“The 
Legislature finds and declares that there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the 
valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances. The 
Legislature finds and declares that it is in the public interest to encourage continued participation in matters of 
public significance, and that this participation should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial process.”).  
“SLAPP” is the acronym for Strategic Litigation Against Public Policy – meaning a lawsuit that is used to bully or 
embarrass an opponent and furthers no goal on the merits of substantive law. 
237 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
238 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995). 
239 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437. 
240 Brady, 373 U.S. at 86 (“the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon 
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the 
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”) 
241 See, e.g., Bennett L. Gersham, Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games Prosecutors Play, 57 CASE W. 
RESERVE L. REV. 531, 531 and sources cited therein (2007) (“Brady actually invites prosecutors to bend, if not 
break, the rules,' and many prosecutors have become adept at Brady gamesmanship to avoid compliance.”); 
Connick v. Thompson, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1358-1366 (2011)(holding a district attorney's office may 
not be held liable under §1983 for failure to train its prosecutors based on a single Brady violation). 
242  Damon Cann & Jeff Yates, Homegrown Institutional Legitimacy: Assessing Citizens’ Diffuse Support for 
Their State Courts, 36 AM.POLITICS RESEARCH 297, 304-305 (2008). 
 TRUTH AND LEGITIMACY IN TRIAL COURTS  54
 
Let’s start with the example of leveraging the “American Rule” to 
extort a settlement.  In response to this dynamic, civil procedure rules 
around the country have added devices such as California Code of Civil 
Procedure section 998,243 or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68,244 which 
enable any litigant party to make a settlement offer that if rejected -- and 
then bettered at trial – will result in “loser pays” – the litigant who rejected 
the settlement offer now will pay in whole or in part their opponent’s fees 
and costs. In other words, the rule makers recognized the manipulator’s 
paradox promoted by the American Rule, and sought to ameliorate the 
distortive effect of the rule.245   
Similarly, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11246 was first inserted 
into the Code and then repeatedly revised to make it increasingly hard for a 
party to get away with tactics motivated by improper motives, which are 
defined as any motive other than merits-based motives.247  A variety of state 
codes mimic Rule 11.248  Similar rules revisions crimp down on the 
opportunity for discovery abuse.249  California has adopted an Anti-SLAPP 
statute.250  Even revisions in criminal procedure often are justified as 
deterring misbehavior or sharp practices by inside players to the criminal 
justice system.251 
                                                
243  CAL. C. CIV. PROC. 998. 
244  FED. R. CIV. PROC. 68. 
245 Kathryn Spier argues that the American rule facilitates settlement instances of asymmetrical damage 
evaluations, and hinders settlement in instances of asymmetrical liability assessments; she argues for a modified 
FRCP 68 rule of fee-shifting against a judge-set metric.  Kathryn Spier, Pretrial bargaining and the design of fee-
shifting rules, 25 RAND J. ECON. 197, 200-210 (1994); accord, Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on 
the Settlement of Litigation, 10 INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 3-27 (1990) (arguing that requiring a losing litigant to pay 
the opponent’s expenses does not remedy the problem of the “American rule,” but that requiring the posting of a 
refundable deposit does). For our purposes, the point is not whether Rule 68 is the best solution, but rather that as 
Spier confirms, fee-shifting rules can influence settlement behaviors in profound ways, and that the system can 
influence litigant choices to promote particular outcomes. 
246  FED. R. CIV. PROC. 11. 
247 See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, Lawyers and Professionalism: A Commentary on the Report of the 
American Bar Association Commission on Professionalism, 18 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 1149, 1165 (1986-1987) (“…the 
Commission endorses Rule 11….  Everyone hopefully now recognizes that lawyers should not file frivolous 
motions.”). 
248 For a summary of the various approaches of the states, see Byron C. Keeling, Toward a Balanced 
Approach to “Frivolous” Litigation: A Critical Review of Federal Rule 11 and State Sanctions Provisions, 21 
PEPP. L. REV. 1067, 1094-1125 (1993-1994). 
249 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. PROC. 37. 
250 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §425.16. 
251 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (“[T]he purpose of the exclusionary rule ‘is to deter--to 
compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way--by removing the incentive to 
disregard it.”’) (internal citations omitted); Katherine Sheridan, Excluding Coerced Witness Testimony to Protect 
a Criminal Defendant’s Right to Due Process of Law and Adequately Deter Police Misconduct, 38 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1221 (2011).   Accord, Sabine Gless, Turth or Due Process?  The Use of Illegally Gathered Evidence in 
Criminal Trials – Germany,  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1743530 (2010).  See generally Susan Bandes, Taking Some 
Rights Too Seriously: The State’s Right to a Fair Trial, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1019 (1987).  For a fuller discussion 
by the United States Supreme Court (in majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions) of various views on the 
balancing of criminal exclusionary rules of probative evidence with fair trial rights, see Stone v. Powell 428 U.S. 
465, 482-489, 496-502, 508-515, 537-542 (1976). 
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What then, can we conclude about lawyers and legitimacy?  System 
rules routinely either encourage or passively allow lawyer (mis)behavior 
which decreases the likelihood that court judgments of what happened will 
correspond to what happened.  While the system does steadily try to 
identify and crimp down on these opportunities, the prevalence of them is 
robust.  This prevalence plays into a pre-existing narrative of public 
perceptions of lawyers.252  And that in turn suggests an as yet unexplored 
vector of possible fragility in the legitimacy of trial courts.   
c. Juries and Legitimacy 
There is a similar dynamic at play with juries.  It is not hard to find a 
robust critique of the American jury.253  The often unstated but apparent 
commonality of jury criticism is the underlying suspicion that juries get 
cases “wrong” a disturbing amount of the time.254   
Juries do get things “wrong,” albeit not with the frequency one 
might suppose. As Professor Bruce Spencer notes, “direct assessments of 
accuracy are not possible on a wide scale because only atypically is the 
correct verdict known, and it is difficult to generalize from those cases to 
the more typical cases where the correct verdict is not knowable.”255  But 
Spencer nonetheless uses it as a starting point to estimate a statistically 
                                                
252 The “public perception” may also be the perception of lawyers themselves.  See generally, Douglass N. 
Frenkel, Robert L. Nelson, & Austin Sarat, Report.  Bringing Legal Realism to the Study of Ethics and 
Professionalism, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 697 (1998).  If internal players actually and routinely are manipulating 
accuracy either maliciously through passive complicity, that is a further indicator of fragile systemic legitimacy.  
Accord, Patrick J. Schlitz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and 
Unethical Profession, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 871 (1999). 
253 See, e.g.,1962-1963 Harvard Law School Dean’s Report at 5-6 (Dean Griswold argues that if the goal is 
justice, juries should be abolished); Warren E. Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary, 57 A.B.A. J. 855, 858 
(1971) (Chief Justice Burger expresses a readiness to eliminate civil juries); Edward J. Devitt, Federal Civil Jury 
Trials Should Be Abolished, 60 A.B.A. J. 570 (1974) (arguing as the title describes). In just one three-month 
period in 2013, national criticism erupted over acquittal verdicts in two Florida criminal homicide trials.  See 
generally, Stephen Daniels, The Question of Jury Competence and the Politics of Civil Justice Reform: Symbols, 
Rhetoric, and Agenda-Building, 52 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 269 (1989).   See also, Scott Stump, Casey Anthony 
judge felt ‘shock, disbelief’ at not guilty verdict, TODAY News (May 6, 2013) http://www.today.com/news/casey-
anthony-judge-felt-shock-disbelief-not-guilty-verdict-6C9791042; Carol D. Leonnig & Jenna Johnson, Anger 
flows at acquittal of George Zimmerman in death of Trayvon Martin, The Washington Post (July 14, 2013) 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/anger-flows-at-acquittal-of-george-zimmerman-in-death-of-trayvon-
martin/2013/07/14/e1a1216a-ec98-11e2-bed3-b9b6fe264871_story.html.  On January 27, 2015, I performed the 
quick search – <“Outrageous Jury Verdicts”> -- in “Bing.”  The database reported 1240 results.  The search 
<abolish jury system>. – a Bing-suggested search that therefore resulted in relevant results without needing to 
filter by putting the search terms in quotation marks -- had 637,000 results.   
254  See Joe S. Cecil, Valerie P. Hans, & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: 
Lessons from Civil Jury Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 727, 742-743 (1990-1991).  This is far from a new criticism.  
At the time the early Americans were considering juries for inclusion in the proposed Constitution, jurors were 
described as decision makers “by chance,” “stupid,” “unprincipled,” and potentially imposing injustice by 
“ignorance or knavery.”  See Kenneth S. Klein, Why Federal Rule of Evidence 403 is Unconstitutional, and Why 
That Matters, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 1077, 1096 (2013), and sources quoted therein. 
255 Bruce D. Spencer, Estimating the Accuracy of Jury Verdicts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 305, 306 
(2007). 
 TRUTH AND LEGITIMACY IN TRIAL COURTS  56
 
defensible model of jury accuracy, and concludes that jury error rates are 
roughly 10%.256  This is in accord with the work of many researchers who 
conclude that juries on the whole reach reasoned and informed decisions.257 
A broad review of the statistical and other social science research concludes 
that jurors are competent decision-makers.258 
Without regard to the accuracy of public perception regarding the 
frequency of jury error, the presence of public perception of jury error is 
empirically verifiable.  In one study 320 individuals were given descriptions 
of the same trial and verdict, varying only whether the jury was 
homogeneous or heterogeneous and whether the verdict was guilty or not 
guilty; the study found a material increase in the perception of an inaccurate 
verdict when all-White juries found a defendant guilty.259  For a social 
scientist what is of interest here is the reasons for community perceptions of 
inaccurate jury verdicts; for our purposes this study confirms the prevalence 
of community perceptions that juries get things wrong.260 
What is unclear – in the absence of legitimacy research -- is the 
relationship of the perception of jury error to legitimacy.  Americans have 
long perceived juries as deeply flawed.  In the ratification debates of the 
proposed Constitution of the United States, it was suggested that juries were 
not “fair.”261  Juries were characterized as “ignorant.”262  Jurors were said to 
be unable to “distinguish between right and wrong.”263 Jurors were 
described as decision makers “by chance,”264 “stupid,”265 “unprincipled,”266 
and potentially imposing injustice by “ignorance or knavery.”267  Yet these 
concerns did not cause the framers to eliminate trial by jury in order to have 
                                                
256 Bruce D. Spencer, Estimating the Accuracy of Jury Verdicts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 305, 310-315, 
326-328 (2007). 
257  See Joe S. Cecil, Valerie P. Hans, & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: 
Lessons from Civil Jury Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 727, 745-746 (1990-1991), and sources cited and quoted 
therein. 
258 See Joe S. Cecil, Valerie P. Hans, & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: 
Lessons from Civil Jury Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 727, 745-764 (1990-1991). 
259 See Leslie Ellis & Shari Siedman Diamond, Race, Diversity, and Jury Composition: Battering and 
Bolstering Legitimacy, 78 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 1033, 1043-1050 (2003). 
260  See generally Stephen Daniels, The Question of Jury Competence and the Politics of Civil Justice 
Reform: Symbols, Rhetoric, and Agenda-Building, 52 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 269 (1989). 
261 REMARKS OF JOHN MARSHALL ON JUNE 20, 1788, DURING THE VIRGINIA STATE CONVENTION 
CONCERNING RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, 
DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 566, 540, 544 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997). 
262 A FARMER, NO. 4, MARCH 21, 1788, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, 
DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 579, 581 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997). 
263  Id. 
264  Id. 
265 ARISTOCROTIS, APRIL 1788, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, 
SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 582, 582 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997). 
266  A [NEW HAMPSHIRE] FARMER, NO. 3, JUNE 6, 1788, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE 
DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 586, 586 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997). 
267  Id. 
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a “legitimate” justice system; to the contrary, trial by jury is enshrined in 
the Constitution three times.268   
The justice system has been intentionally set choosing jurors – warts 
and all – as preferable to judges.269  Contemporary reform of the role and 
scope of jury trials, however, suggest that public trust in juries has turned.  
Legislative reform such as increasing burdens of proof to recover punitive 
damages,270 elimination or capping of the right to recover some forms of 
damages,271 or increasing the thresholds to finding some forms of 
liability,272 all are examples of dissatisfaction with jury verdicts resulting in 
what has now been called by some “the vanishing trial.”273 
So in the absence of empirical research, it is hard to formulate a 
reasonable hypothesis about the expected relationship of juries to 
legitimacy. There is ample evidence of dissatisfaction with the accuracy of 
dispute resolution through trial by jury, but there is ambiguity about 
whether judges are perceived as any better, and we know from prior 
research that concern about judges has not seemed to undermine legitimacy. 
d. Conclusions About Fragility of Trial Court 
Legitimacy 
As noted above, there is thin extant scholarly study of the resiliency 
or fragility of trial court legitimacy.  That work focuses on judges, and 
suggests that because of concerns with judge neutrality, there is some 
fragility to perceptions of legitimacy.  We can formulate a tentative 
hypothesis that perceptions of lawyers may add to that fragility.  We should 
be more hesitant to formulate a similar hypothesis about juries.  But one 
theme that emerges from all of these contexts is that whatever legitimacy 
the courts have, it rests on a premise that the courts are trying to get to a 
just, fair, and accurate result – in the colloquial understanding of those 
terms -- pretty much all of the time. 
 
                                                
268 U.S. CONST. art. III; amend. VI; amend. VII. 
269  See Kenneth S. Klein, Why Federal Rule of Evidence 403 is Unconstitutional, and Why That Matters, 47 
U. RICH. L. REV. 1077, 1098 (2013). 
270  See CAL. CIV. C. §3294. 
271  See Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice Damages Caps, 80 
N.Y.U. L.R. 391, 412-415 (2005). 
272  See, e.g., Brian S. Sommer, The PSLRA Decade of Decadence: Improving Balance in the Private 
Securities Litigation Arena with a Screening Panel Approach, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 413, 420-425 (2004-2005) 
(describing Congressional attempts to impair securities class actions). 
273  See, e.g., 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459-984 (2004), publishing fifteen articles addressing the 
vanishing trial phenomena.  
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B. “Truth” in Courts and Legitimacy Fragility 
It is in this context -- that the legitimacy of the trial courts rests on a 
foundation of uncertain but possible fragility – that we turn to the import of 
“truth” in courts to the legitimacy of trial courts.  Cann and Yates found that 
familiarity with the courts breeds contempt – “greater knowledge regarding 
one’s state courts actually decreases their perceptions of court 
legitimacy.”274 If so, then the meaning of truth in courts is problematic, 
since legitimacy may already be fragile, and it is very likely that a non-
reflective, super-majority of the public does not understand the meaning of 
“truth” in courts. 
As the explication of the meaning of “truth” in courts developed, 
courts temper “fairness” with the need for “finality,” and courts 
intentionally delimit fact-based decisions in deference to other, external 
values.  Put another way, two of the four “legitimacy” factors identified by 
Cann and Yates – diffuse support allowing an institution to persist and 
retain its authority without regard to agreement with specific decisions275 -- 
are undermined by the nature of “truth” in courts. 
That is particularly troubling because there is reason to be concerned 
that unfamiliarity is eroding. There are a variety of indicators that the 
community is increasingly becoming broadly aware of what happens in the 
trial courts.  Most directly, there is surprisingly broad personal experience 
with the courts across the entire national population.  More than one-third of 
eligible Americans will serve as a juror at least once in their lifetime.276 
 
Beyond this direct personal experience, there is at least shallow but 
widespread public awareness of court cases.  Trials with ironic frequency 
gain sufficient purchase in public perception to become – at least for a time 
– part of the public lexicon as the “trial of the century.”  Just a few of the 
labeled “trial of the century” cases in the last 100 years (as of the writing of 
this Article) are the trial of Sacco and Vanzetti,277 the trial of Leopold and 
                                                
274 Damon Cann & Jeff Yates, Homegrown Institutional Legitimacy: Assessing Citizens’ Diffuse Support for 
Their State Courts, 36 AM.POLITICS RESEARCH 297, 314 (2008) (citations omitted).  In more recent work, Cann 
and Yates have found inopposite results.  Email dated May 29, 2015 from Jeff Yates to Ken Klein (on file with 
Author). 
275 See Damon Cann & Jeff Yates, Homegrown Institutional Legitimacy: Assessing Citizens’ Diffuse Support 
for Their State Courts, 36 AM. POLITICS RESEARCH 297, 303-305 (2008). 
276 See Gregory E. Mize, Paula Hannaford-Agor, Nicole L. Waters, The State-of-the States Survey of Jury , 
Improvement Efforts: A Compendium Report 8 (NCSC 2007) (available at http://www.ncsc-
jurystudies.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CJS/SOS/SOSCompendiumFinal.ashx). 
277 See JOHN DAVIS, SACCO AND VANZETTI: REBEL LIVES 1 (Ocean Press 2004) (“Within a year it was going 
to become the 'trial of the century.”). 
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Loeb,278 the “Scopes Monkey Trial,”279 the Lindbergh baby kidnapping 
trial,280 the Nuremberg trials,281 the Sam Sheppard murder trial,282 the O.J. 
Simpson murder trial,283 the impeachment trial of President Clinton,284 the 
antitrust trial of Microsoft,285 and the trial of Michael Jackson.286 As 
attorney F. Lee Bailey quipped in 1999, "Every time I turn around, there's a 
new trial of the century."287   
But the work of the justice system can become part of the public 
lexicon even short of sensationalist tags.  In a forty-six month period, the 
murder trials of Casey Anthony,288 Jody Arias,289 and the so-called 
“American Sniper” killer290 all dominated the news cycle in quick 
succession.  Less prurient but nonetheless generally followed civil trials of 
recent vintage include the IP battles between Apple and Samsung291 the trial 
concerning RIM’s patent rights to the Blackberry electronic device,292 as 
well as the personal-injury lawsuit known as the “McDonalds coffee 
case.”293    
Technology nurtures and grows this general communal awareness of 
what happens in courts.  By 2008 (still relatively early days in the context of 
ubiquitous access to the Internet), trial strategy consultants observed, 
“Virtually every trial is newsworthy to someone and can therefore end up 
on the Internet …..”294  Indeed, this very concern has led to a host of 
academic and judicial introspection about a proper procedural response to 
                                                
278 See Douglas O. Linder, The Leopold and Loeb Trial: A Brief Account, 
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/leoploeb/Accountoftrial.html (1997) ("..the Leopold and Loeb trial 
has the elements to justify its billing as the first "trial of the century.") (last visited February 8, 2014). 
279 See Peter Carlson, (The Last) Trial of the Century, THE WASHINGTON POST p. C01 (January 4, 1999). 
280 See Peter Carlson, (The Last) Trial of the Century, THE WASHINGTON POST p. C01 (January 4, 1999). 
281 See Joseph Canon, The Real Trial of the Century, THE NEW YORK TIMES (June 9, 2002), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/09/books/the-real-trial-of-the-century.html (last visited February 8, 2014). 
282 See Peter Carlson, (The Last) Trial of the Century, THE WASHINGTON POST p. C01 (January 4, 1999). 
283 See Peter Carlson, (The Last) Trial of the Century, THE WASHINGTON POST p. C01 (January 4, 1999). 
284 See Peter Carlson, (The Last) Trial of the Century, THE WASHINGTON POST p. C01 (January 4, 1999). 
285 See Peter Carlson, (The Last) Trial of the Century, THE WASHINGTON POST p. C01 (January 4, 1999). 
286 See Michael Ventre, O.J. case will pale in comparison to Jackson trial, TODAY (January 30, 2005) 
http://www.today.com/id/6877844/ns/today-entertainment/t/oj-case-will-pale-comparison-jackson-trial/ (last 
visited February 8, 2014). 
287 Peter Carlson, (The Last) Trial of the Century, THE WASHINGTON POST at p. C01 (January 4, 1999). 
288 Casey Anthony Trial Fast Facts, CNN LIBRARY (July 1, 2014), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/04/us/casey-anthony-trial-fast-facts/index.html. 
289 Jodi Arias News, ABC NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/topics/news/jodi-arias.htm. 
290  Tasha Tsiaperas, Trial for man accused of killing ‘American Sniper’ Chris Kyle begins in Stephenville, 
THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS at A1 (February 11, 2015). 
291  Reuters, Apple, Samsung Electronics Agree to Drop Patent Lawsuits Outside U.S., HUFFPOST TECH 
(August 5, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/05/apple-samsung-drop-lawsuit_n_5653206.html. 
292  Rob Kelley, BlackBerry maker, NTP ink $612 million settlement, CNN MONEY (March 3, 2006), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/05/apple-samsung-drop-lawsuit_n_5653206.html. 
293  Andrea Gerlin, McDonlad’s Callousness Was Real Issue, Jurors Say, In Case of Burned Woman, THE 
WALL STREET JOURNAL (September 1, 1994). 
294 Ellen Brickman, Julie Blackman, Roy Futterman, & Jed, Dinnerstein, How Juror Internet Use Has 
Changed the American Jury Trial, 1 J. CT. INNOVATION 287, 292 (2008). 
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the impact of the Internet on jurors – both pretrial and during trial.295 The 
courts provide a seemingly endless source of public fascination, and as a 
consequence there is broad – albeit potentially shallow – growing general 
public awareness of what happens in the courts. 
And then, of course, there is the impact of electronic media.  Popular 
television series such as CSI have caused enormous angst among lawyers 
and judges about the impact of popular media on the expectations of trial 
jurors.296  This angst is grounded in the understanding that the public has an 
awareness of and a general set of preconceptions about what it believes – 
rightly or wrongly -- happens in courts. 
There even is research suggesting that this broad awareness of what 
happens in courts is not entirely shallow.  There is some evidence of people 
fashioning their specific behavior in response to how that behavior may be 
evaluated in a future trial.  Professors Gideon Parchomovsky and Alex Stein 
discuss and analyze instances when potential future litigants have the 
opportunity – assuming they are aware of what happens in courts -- to 
create beneficial potential evidence.297  Parchomovsky and Stein detail 
examples of persons from a variety of legal contexts – property law, patent 
law, criminal law, and tort law -- actually doing so; persons with sufficient 
awareness of the evidentiary treatment of actions modify behavior in order 
to maximize future trial outcomes.298  Parchomovsky and Stein conclude 
that people in the general community make choices – indeed, sometimes 
economically “sub-optimal” choices -- based on their fear of how those 
choices might be used in a trial.299  In other words, at a level far more 
consequential than amusement with telenovella-like courtroom dramas, 
there is increasing societal awareness of what happens in courts. 
Are there presently concrete examples of this awareness eroding 
legitimacy?  Arguably, there is exactly the opposite.  
                                                
295  See, e.g., Amanda McGee, Juror Misconduct in The Twenty-First Century: The Prevalence of The 
Internet and Its Effect on American Courtrooms, 30 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 301 (2010); Daniel William Bell, 
Juror Misconduct and the Internet, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 81 (2010-2011); Marcy Zora, The Real Social Network: 
How Jurors’ Use of Social Media and Smart Phones Affects a Defendant’s Sixth Amendment Rights, 2012 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 577 (2012); Steven Wallace, The Internet infects the courtroom, 93 JUDICATURE 138 (2009-2010). 
296  See, Simon A. Cole & Rachel Dioso-Villa, Investigating the ‘CSI Effect’ Effect: Media and Litigation 
Crisis in Criminal Law, 61 STANFORD L. REV. 1335 (2009). 
297 See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Distortionary Effect of Evidence on Primary Behavior, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 518, 530-542 (2010). 
298 See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Distortionary Effect of Evidence on Primary Behavior, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 518, 532-534 & fns. 47-56 (2010). 
299 See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Distortionary Effect of Evidence on Primary Behavior, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 518 (2010). 
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Legitimacy Theory would predict that if the community accepts the 
courts as legitimate, then when there is a perception that the courts are 
getting things wrong, the community either will do nothing or will work 
within normal institutional channels (as opposed to acts of civil 
disobedience) to recalibrate the system.300  So what do we see?  We see the 
predicted behavior of legitimacy theory – that a community that accepts 
courts as legitimate either will do nothing or will work within normal 
institutional channels (as opposed to acts of civil disobedience) to 
recalibrate the system.  Indeed, we can see this so ubiquitously that it reads 
like an Old Testament list of who begat whom. 
In civil litigation the assertion that the system is out of balance is 
usually expressed by the pejorative phrasing of a “litigation crisis,” or a 
concern with rampant “frivolous litigation.”  Concerns with an explosion of 
inmate litigation begat the Prison Litigation Reform Act.301  Concerns with 
patent “trolls” begat calls for procedural reform of patent laws.302  Concerns 
with the abuse of antitrust litigation begat its own procedural reform.303  A 
perceived explosion in asbestos litigation begat calls to take all such claims 
out of Article III courts.304  Asserted extortive securities litigation begat the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.305  The generic assertion of 
frivolous litigation306 begat calls for massive tort reform,307 procedural 
reform,308 increasing burdens of proof to recover punitive damages,309 
elimination or capping of the right to recover some forms of damages,310 
and increasing the thresholds to finding some forms of liability.311 …and so 
                                                
300  See, DAVID EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE 278-280, 285-286 (John Wiley & Sons 
1965). 
301  See, e.g., Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1558-1559 (2003). 
302  See, e.g., Michael J, Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property 
Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 510-511 (2003) 
303  Id. 
304  See Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Is There a Need for an Administrative Alternative?, 
13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1819(1991-1992). 
305  See Steven A. Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform in Private Securities Litigation: Dealing With the 
Meritorious as Well as the Frivolous, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055 (1999). 
306  See generally Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MARYLAND L. REV. 3 (1986). 
307  See Thomas A. Eaton, Of Frivolous Litigation and Runaway Juries: A View From the Bench, 41 GA. L. 
REV. 431 (2007); Benjamin R. Civiletti, Zeroing in on the Real Litigation Crisis: Irrational Justice, Needless 
Delays, Excessive Costs, 46 MARYLAND L. REV. 40 (1986). 
308  See John W. Wade, On Frivolous Litigation: A Study of Tort Liability and Procedural Sanctions, 14 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 433 (1986); Byron C. Keeling, Toward a Balanced Approach to “Frivolous” Litigation: A 
Critical Review of Rule 11 and State Sanctions Provisions, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 1067 (1994). 
309  See CAL. CIV. C. §3294. 
310  See Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice Damages Caps, 80 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 412-415 (2005); David M. Studdert, Michelle M. Mello, Atul A. Gawande, Tejal K. Gandhi, 
Allen Kachaia, Catherine Yoon, Ann Louise Puopolo, & Troyen A. Brennan, Claims, Errors, and Compensation 
Payments in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 354 N. ENGL. J. MED. 2024 (2006) 
311  See, e.g., Brian S. Sommer, The PSLRA Decade of Decadence: Improving Balance in the Private 
Securities Litigation Arena with a Screening Panel Approach, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 413, 420-425 (2004-2005) 
(describing Congressional attempts to impair securities class actions). 
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on and so on and so on.312  
Persistent recalibration of the courts in response to accuracy 
concerns is a pattern on the criminal side as well.  The perceived erratic 
sentencing patterns of judges begat mandatory sentencing guidelines.313  
The perceived inability of the traditional legal system to handle terrorism 
begat Guantanamo and military tribunals.314  The perceived inability of 
normal criminal procedure to resolve childhood sexual abuse claims begat 
revised statutes of limitation.315  The “insanity” acquittal of John Hinckley 
begat reform of FRE 704(b).316  
This is not to say that there are no instances of civil disobedience in 
response to concerns of how the law is implemented or interpreted.  The 
Civil Rights movement of the 1960’s is a stark example.317  Another 
example comes from the annual protests against the Supreme Court because 
of the Roe v. Wade318 decision.319  Yet the broad sweep of American history 
all stands for the resilient institutional legitimacy of the trial courts.  
So what then can we conclude about the relationship between 
legitimacy to truth in courts?  If – as this Article posits -- truth in courts 
means something different from colloquial understandings of accuracy, then 
does the dissonance between what the public believes courts do and what 
courts actually do expose a weakness in the legitimacy of the courts?320  
                                                
312  See David A. Logan, Juries, Judges, and the Politics of Tort Reform, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 903, 907-14 
(2015). 
313  See, e.g., Albert Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 901, 906 (1991) (“The principal argument for sentencing guidelines is … they limit the play of 
judicial personality and inhibit discrimination on racial and other grounds.”); see generally KATE STITH & JOSE 
A.CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (U. Chicago Press 1998).  
The guidelines worked – under the mandatory minimum guidelines variation in sentencing materially shrunk; 
when the federal courts returned to advisory sentencing guidelines, variance in judicial sentencing doubled.  See 
Crystal S. Yang, Have Interjudge Sentencing Disparities Increased in an Advisory Guidelines Regime? Evidence 
From Booker, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1268, 1271, 1275 (2014). 
314  See generally Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military 
Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002); George P. Fletcher, On Justice and War: Contradictions in the Proposed 
Military Tribunals, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 635 (2001-2002); Laura A. Dickinson, Using Legal Process to 
Fight Terrorism: Detentions, Military Commissions, International Tribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75. S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1407 (2001-2002); Johan Steyn, Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, 53 INTL. & COMP. L. Q. 1 (2004). 
315  See generally Jorge L. Carro & Joseph V. Hatala, Recovered Memories, Extended Statutes of Limitations 
and Discovery Exceptions in Childhood Sexual Abuse Cases: Have We Gone Too Far?, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 1239 
(1995-1996). 
316  See, e.g., Anne Lawson Braswell, Resurrection of the Ultimate Issue Rule: Federal Rule of Evidence 
704(b) and the Insanity Defense, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 620, 620 (1987) (“Prompted by public reaction to the jury’s 
not guilty by reason of insanity verdict of would-be presidential assassin John Hinckley, Jr., Congress amended 
Federal Rule of Evidence 704 in 1984.”). 
317  See generally Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past, 
91 J. AM. HIST. 1233 (2005). 
318  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
319  See marchforlife.org. 
320 See Charles Nesson, The Evidence or The Events? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 
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That concern can at least be looked for anecdotally. 
Much has been and will be written on the shooting of Michael 
Brown and the aftermath, but in short form, Michael Brown’s death lit a 
firestorm of public attention on police encounters with persons of color, 
which led to weeks of protests in Ferguson, Missouri, which led to protests 
nationwide, which led to attention on other apparently similar police 
encounters (most notably, the choking death of Eric Garner in New York 
City) and protests concerning those encounters, which led to focus and 
protests concerning the grand jury evaluations of the encounters, which led 
to serious discussion at high institutional levels of reform of grand juries 
and their processes.321  The essential allegation was that when the actor was 
a police officer and the victim was a person of color, the likelihood was 
remote of criminal charges even being brought – much less there being a 
conviction and sentence.322   Or, put another way, there was civil discord in 
response to the perception that values other than “a search for the truth” 
distorted the likelihood of reaching a correct outcome.323 
The Brown/Garner rounds of public protest echo the reaction to the 
verdict in the murder trial of O.J. Simpson.324  A common explanation of 
the verdict – and the reaction to the verdict – is the possibility that a 
                                                                                                                       
HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1379 (1985) (arguing the public will not defer to a judge’s decision that amounts to a 
probability based bet on what happened). 
321  See, e.g., on March 17, 2015 the Young Lawyers Division of the American Bar Association presented a 
CLE Webinar entitled “Grand Jury Reform, Post-Ferguson.”  See generally, Ben Kesling, Missouri Governor 
Announces Creation of ‘Ferguson Commission’, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2014), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/missouri-governor-announces-creation-of-ferguson-commission-1413914495; Lee 
Van Der Voo, Grand jury reform propelled by Ferguson, INVESTIGATEWEST (Dec. 30, 2014), 
http://www.invw.org/article/grand-jury-reform-propell-1490; Robert Gavin, Grand jury reform call: Top judge 
asks judicial roel in cases of death or near-death of civilians by cops, timesunion.com (Feb. 17, 2015), 
http://www.timesunion.com/news/article/Top-judge-wants-big-grand-jury-changes-in-police-6085342.php (“In 
the wake of polarizing grand jury decisions in the police-related deaths of Michael Brown and Eric Garner, New 
York's top judge wants judges to oversee the grand jury process in cases involving deadly and near-deadly 
incidents involving police and civilians.”). 
322  See, e.g., http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/nyregion/grand-jury-said-to-bring-no-charges-in-staten-
island-chokehold-death-of-eric-garner.html?_r=0. 
323 That perception largely was affirmed when on March 4, 2015, the United States Department of Justice 
Civil Rights Division released its Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department, which included among its 
findings: 
Ferguson has allowed its focus on revenue generation to fundamentally compromise the role of Ferguson’s 
municipal court. The municipal court does not act as a neutral arbiter of the law or a check on unlawful 
police conduct. Instead, the court primarily uses its judicial authority as the means to compel the payment of 
fines and fees that advance the City’s financial interests. This has led to court practices that violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process and equal protection requirements. The court’s practices also impose 
unnecessary harm, overwhelmingly on African-American individuals, and run counter to public safety. 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-
releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report_1.pdf at 3. 
324  See generally JEWELLE TAYLOR GIBBS, RACE AND JUSTICE: RODNEY KING AND O.J. SIMPSON IN A 
HOUSE DIVIDED (Jossey-Bass 1996); John Fiske, Admissible Postmodernity: Some Remarks on Rodney King, O.J. 
Simpson, and Contemporary Culture, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 917 (1995-1996).  Accord Craig M. Bradley & Joseph L. 
Hoffman, Public Perception, Justice, and “The Search for Truth” in Criminal Cases, 69 S. Cal. L.Rev. 1267 
(1996). 
 TRUTH AND LEGITIMACY IN TRIAL COURTS  64
 
murderer was let free not because he was innocent but rather in order to 
send a message to LAPD about police practices.325    
The Simpson protests and the Brown/Garner protests were a more 
muted version of the protests after the state court acquittal of police officers 
for the beating of Rodney King.326   Those were a dramatic example of a 
non-trivial percentage of public disagreement with compromising the 
likelihood of accurate verdicts in response to non-accuracy values. 
So we can identify examples of civil discord in response to the 
perception of the system factoring in non-accuracy values as part of a 
decision process.  But are there also examples of passive acceptance of the 
system factoring in non-accuracy values as part of a decision process? 
This brings us to the interesting world of criminal exclusionary 
rules.  One feature of the criminal justice system is the set of doctrines 
excluding evidence improperly gathered, such as failure to give Miranda 
warnings.327  We could postulate that there is broad, shallow public 
awareness of these doctrines through the colloquial phrasing, “got off on a 
technicality.”328  But the primary reaction to these doctrines outside of legal 
academics and courts is media-driven grousing, not anything approaching 
deep legitimacy concerns. Further, even the grousing arguably is a tool of 
other agendas, rather than an indicator of legitimacy concerns – technicality 
acquittals only seem troublesome when they drive accuracy outcomes that 
the complainer disagrees with.  Put another way, the same person who 
complains that an accused arms trafficker “got off on a technicality” may 
express no concern when Oliver North – charged with being a central figure 
in the “arms for hostages” “Iran-Contra Affair”329 – got off on a 
technicality.330 
None of these examples supports drawing definitive conclusions.  It 
is a profound logical fallacy to draw conclusions from retrospective 
anecdotal events.  Consider a person who every day buys a lottery ticket 
from the same local convenience store, and never wins.  Then two days in a 
                                                
325  Id. 
326  Id. 
327  See generally William J. Mertens & Silas Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary 
Rulke: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365 (1981-1982); Raymond A. Atkins & 
Paul H. Rubin, Effects of Criminal Procedure on Crime Rates: Mapping Out the Consequences of the 
Exclusionary Rule, 46 J. L. & ECON. 157, 157-179 (2003); Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary 
Rule: An Empirical Assessment, 8 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 585, 585-609 (1983). 
328  See, e.g., http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/OffOnATechnicality. 
329  See http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/general-article/reagan-iran/. 
330  See http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Oliver_North. 
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row, the person buys a ticket from a gas station in another town.  Both 
tickets win.  This is not evidence that the gas station sells winning tickets 
and the convenience store does not.  At best, it is a suggestion of something 
that bears exploration through collection of good data in a properly 
structured study. 
But what all of this does expose is a dissonance between the judicial 
system’s self-articulation of the system’s commitment to accuracy, and the 
public perception of the courts.  This may best be illustrated by the work of 
“Innocence Projects.” According to the National Registry of Exonerations, a 
project of the University of Michigan, the year 2014 had a record number of 
exonerations (125), continuing a broad year-to-year upward trend since 
1989.331  Why do “Innocence Projects” chase irrefutable examples of 
innocent convicts on death row?  Surely the primary motivation is saving an 
innocent life.  But secondarily it is to demonstrate to the public in a way 
that cannot be denied the possible horrors of capital punishment.  That 
secondary goal only resonates because of the premise that the public 
perception of the role of the courts is one seeking just, fair, and accurate 
results (in a colloquial sense of those words).  It is hard to imagine that the 
public sentiment would be – faced with post-conviction affidavits showing 
an accused’s actual innocence – that the convict was (in the words of the 
Supreme Court of the United States) “not innocent, in any sense of the 
word.”332 
CONCLUSION 
In Chief Justice John Roberts’s 2015 Year-End Report on the 
Federal Judiciary, he described the recent amendments to the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure as predicated on the idea that cost-efficient, speedy 
dispute resolution is necessary to justice:  “Our Nation’s courts are today’s 
guarantors of justice….  [L]awyers … have an affirmative duty …, with the 
court, to achieve prompt and efficient resolutions of disputes ….  [W]e must 
engineer a change in our legal culture that places a premium on the public’s 
interest in speedy, fair, and efficient justice.”333  This notion – equating 
efficiency, affordability, and finality with justice – underlies the strong 
affinity of the courts for procedural streamlining.  Courts are animating a 
view that it serves justice to -- within constitutional constraints – deploy 
                                                
331  http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Exoneration-by-Year.aspx. 
332  Herrera, supra, 506 U.S. at 419.   Herrera, and the view of innocence the Court enunciated in Herrera, is 
not an idiosyncratic instance.  See Bhardia v. State, 774 S.E. 2d 90 (Ga. 2015) (trial court properly denied 
extraordinary motion for new trial to introduce DNA evidence of innocence of rape because defendant’s 
inadequate showing of newly discovered evidence which could not have been found with due diligence). 
333  http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2015year-endreport.pdf, pp. 3, 6. 
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every available tool to maximize litigation as an efficient and affordable 
direct line to finality.  Hence, we see, among many other “reforms,” 
reduction in jury size, pressure to settle or arbitrate, compression of open 
discovery rights, crimping of habeas corpus justifications, dismissal of 
factually sufficient claims as “implausible,” strict preservation of error 
standards to support appellate reversal, heightened thresholds for 
conviction-reversal based on prosecutorial misconduct, etc..   
But each of these incremental steps toward “justice” is an 
incremental step away from the probability that a judgment of what 
occurred in a case corresponds to what actually occurred.  For example, the 
amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) to “crystalize[]… 
the common-sense concept of proportionality …. [will] eliminate 
unnecessary or wasteful discovery …[as determined by] a neutral arbiter—
the federal judge,”334 but inevitably also will foreclose discovery of an 
indeterminate body of apparently wasteful but actually insightful discovery 
that would have advanced the accurate determination of what objectively 
happened in a dispute.   
Is this a step away from or toward discerning, in any individual case, 
the “truth?”  Well, that depends on what is meant by “truth.”  And therein 
lies the point.  What this Article proposes is that refinements in procedural 
justice move cases closer to what courts mean by “truth” but move cases 
further away from what colloquially is generally meant by “truth.”  Or put 
another way, system insiders equate “truth” with “justice,” but for system 
outsiders the two terms have different meanings. 
The move toward more procedural justice at the expense of some 
colloquial truth may be sound public policy.  But so long as it is not 
transparent public policy garnering large public support, it can come at an 
enormous cost.  That cost is the erosion of judicial legitimacy.  And that is a 
cost that has yet to be accounted for in the consideration of further 
procedural streamlining of civil and criminal process.   
                                                
334  http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2015year-endreport.pdf, pp. 6, 7. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Country Jury System335 Hearsay Evidence Character Evidence 
Albania None.336 Explicitly admissible, unless 
the declarant is available to 
testify.337 
No ban. 
Armenia None.338 No ban. No ban. 
Australia Only used 
when the 
charge is a 
serious 
crime.339 
Ban with exceptions.340 Admissible if probative 
value substantially 
outweighs prejudicial 
effect.341 
Chile None.342 No ban. No ban. 
China None.343 Ban,344 but judges have 
discretion to admit.345 
Ban on propensity evidence, 
modeled after Federal Rules 
of Evidence.346 
Czech 
Republic 
None.347 No ban. No ban. 
England Only used in a 
small 
percentage of 
Explicitly admissible in civil 
trials.349  Ban with 
exceptions in criminal 
No ban in civil trials.  Ban 
with exceptions in criminal 
trials.351 
                                                
335 For our purposes, “jury system” means a system where lay jurors act as fact-finders, deliberate, and issue 
verdicts.  This table does not distinguish between “mixed systems” (where lay assessors serve with professional 
judges or where laypersons deliberate with professional judges), and systems with no lay participation.  For a 
discussion on variations of lay participation around the world, see Steven J. Colby, Note, A Jury for Israel?: 
Determining When a Lay Jury System is Ideal in a Heterogeneous Country, 47 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 121, 124–25 
(2014). 
336 DR. MARIJKE MALSCH, DEMOCRACY IN THE COURTS: LAY PARTICIPATION IN EUROPEAN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEMS 57 (2009). 
337 Code of Civil Procedure art. 598, Fletorja zyrtare Nos. 9, 10, and 11 (1996); Code of Criminal Procedure 
art. 154, Fletorja zyrtare, Nos. 5–7 (1995). 
338 MALSCH, supra note 314, at 57 (2009). 
339 Ethan J. Leib, A Comparison of Criminal Jury Decision Rules in Democratic Countries, 5 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 629, 635 (2008). 
340 Commonwealth Evidence Act 1995 ss 63, 65. 
341 Id. s 49. 
342 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, SWEDEN 2013: HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 7, 
www.state.gov/documents/organization/220640.pdf 
343 John J. Capowski, China’s Evidentiary and Procedural Reforms, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the 
Harmonization of Civil and Common Law, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 455, 471 (2012). 
344 Uniform Provisions of Evidence of the People’s Court (promulgated by Inst. of Evidence Law and 
Forensic Sci., CUPL, Oct. 8, 2007) art. 28. 
345 Id. art. 32. 
346 Id. arts. 33–34.  For a discussion of why China, a civil law country with no jury system, has modeled its 
first evidentiary code after the United States’ Federal Rules of Evidence, see Capowski, supra note 321. 
347 Ivana Borzova, Scheme for Evaluating Judicial Systems 2013: Czech Republic, EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
FOR THE EFFICIENCY OF JUSTICE (CEPEJ), www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/default_en.asp (find 
“Czech Republic” in “Replies by country” drop-down menu) (last visited Apr. 26, 2015). 
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Country Jury System335 Hearsay Evidence Character Evidence 
criminal 
trials.348 
trials.350 
Germany None.352 No ban. No ban. 
Hondura
s 
None.353 No ban, but in criminal trials 
there is a preference for non-
hearsay evidence.354 
No ban. 
Iran None.355 Explicitly admissible in 
criminal trials.356 
No ban.  Explicitly 
admissible in determining 
punishment in criminal 
cases.357 
Jamaica For serious 
crimes only.358 
Explicitly admissible, except 
in criminal trials, oral 
hearsay is inadmissible if the 
declarant is available to 
testify.359 
No ban. 
Korea In criminal 
trials, juries 
render 
“advisory 
opinions” 
which judges 
are not bound 
to follow.360 
Prior to the advent of the 
criminal jury, there were no 
exclusionary rules.  Now, 
there are some per se rules 
barring hearsay and other 
types of unfairly prejudicial 
evidence.361 
                                                                                                                       
349 Civil Evidence Act, 1995, c. 38, § 1. 
351 Id. § 101. 
348 Leib, supra note 317, at 637. 
350 Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 144. 
352 Colby, supra note 313, at 125. 
353 U.S. DEPT OF STATE, HONDURAS 2013: HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 9, 
www.state.gov/documents/organization/220663.pdf. 
354 Decreto No. 189-84, Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 199.  Most other Latin American evidence codes 
do not even recognize hearsay or character as evidentiary issues.  KENNETH L. KARST, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 
IN LATIN AMERICA: A CASE BOOK 52 (1975); Daniel Pulecio-Boek, The Genealogy of Prosecutorial Discretion in 
Latin America: A Comparative and Historical Analysis of the Adversarial Reforms in the Region, 13 RICH. J. 
GLOBAL L. & BUS. 67, 101 (2014). 
355 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, IRAN 2013: HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 12, 
www.state.gov/documents/organization/220564.pdf. 
356 ISLAMIC PENAL CODE 2003, arts. 162, 171, 176, 187, 188. 
357 Id. arts. 38(e), 60, 64. 
358 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, JAMAICA 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 10, 
www.state.gov/documents/organization/220666.pdf. 
359 Evidence Act §§ 31C–31E. 
360 Hon. Antoinette Plogstedt, E-Jurors: A View from the Bench, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 597, 601 (2013). 
361 See Eric Ilhyung Lee, Expert Evidence in the Republic of Korea and Under the U.S. Federal Rules of 
Evidence: A Comparative Study, 19 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 585, 601 (1997) (noting “the absence of 
provisions on issues such as relevance and hearsay” in the Korean rules of evidence); Ryan Y. Park, The 
Globalizing Jury Trial: Lessons and Insights from Korea, AM J. INT’L L. 525, 554 (2010) (noting that “the advent 
of jury trials was accompanied by more stringent per se rules on issues such as hearsay.”).   
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Country Jury System335 Hearsay Evidence Character Evidence 
New Zealand Only used in a 
small 
percentage of 
trials.362 
Ban with exceptions.363 Explicitly admissible, except 
in criminal trials, the 
prosecution may offer such 
evidence only where its 
probative value outweighs 
the risk of unfair 
prejudice.364 
Poland None.365 No ban. No ban. 
Scotland Only used in a 
small 
percentage of 
criminal 
trials.366 
Explicitly admissible in civil 
trials.367  Ban with 
exceptions in criminal 
trials.368 
No ban in civil trials.  
Broadly allowed in criminal 
trials.369 
Slovenia None.370 Explicitly admissible in civil 
trials.371  No ban in criminal 
trials. 
No ban. 
South Africa None.372 Ban with exceptions giving 
judge discretion.373 
No ban. 
Sweden None.374 No ban. No ban. 
Tanzania None.375 Ban with exceptions.376 Ban, except admissible for 
determining damages in civil 
trials.377 
Turkey None.378 No ban. No ban. 
                                                
362 Neil Cameron, Susan Potter, & Warren Young, The New Zealand Jury, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
102, 138 (1999). 
363 Evidence Act 2006, § 18. 
364 Id. §§ 40(2), 43(1). 
365 Colby, supra note 313, at 125. 
366 Leib, supra note 317, at 637. 
367 Civil Evidence Act, 1988, c. 32, § 2(1). 
368 Criminal Procedure Act, 1995, c. 46, § 259. 
369 Id. § 270. 
370 Jasa Vrabec, Scheme for Evaluating Judicial Systems 2013: Slovenia, EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR THE 
EFFICIENCY OF JUSTICE (CEPEJ), www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/default_en.asp (find 
“Slovenia” in “Replies by country” drop-down menu) (last visited Apr. 26, 2015). 
371 Civil Procedure Act of 2004 art. 4, No. 36/2004. 
372 Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 165, 172 
(2006). 
373 Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 § 3. 
374 Malin Kall et al., Scheme for Evaluating Judicial Systems 2013: Sweden, EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR 
THE EFFICIENCY OF JUSTICE (CEPEJ), www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/default_en.asp (find 
“Sweden” in “Replies by country” drop-down menu) (last visited Apr. 26, 2015). 
375 WORLD JURY SYSTEMS 424 (Neil Vidmar, ed., 2000). 
376 Evidence Act, 1967, §§ 34–39.  The Evidence Act fails to distinguish relevancy from hearsay; several 
provisions referring to “relevant” evidence are actually categories of admissible hearsay.  Ronald J. Allen et al., 
Reforming the Law of Evidence of Tanzania (Part Two): Conceptual Overview and Practical Steps, 32 BOSTON 
UNIV. INT’L L.J. 1, 37 (2014). 
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